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INTRODUCTION

For Americans at least, active concern for human rights on the international plane is demonstrated perhaps most conspicuously in the promotion and protection of human rights through the United Nations and
its allied agencies'-apart, that is, from the promotion and protection of
human rights through United States foreign policy and the work of such
nongovernmental organizations as Amnesty International. Supplementing this globally-oriented human rights activity, however, are international human rights regimes operating regionally in Western Europe, the
Americas, Africa and the Middle East.2 Concededly, Asia is not yet represented,' and only the first three of the represented regions have gone so
1. For discussion of the pertinent work of the United Nations proper, see, e.g.,
Farer, The UN and Human Rights: More than a Whimper, 9 HuM. RTS. Q. 550
(1987); Forsythe, The United Nations and Human Rights, 1945-1985, 100 POL. SCI.
Q. 249 (1985). See also J. CAREY, UN PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
(1970); H. TOLLEY, JR., THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1987). For dis-

cussion of the pertinent work of certain of the agencies of the United Nations, see Marks,
The Complaint Procedure of the United Nations Educational,Scientific and Cultural
Organization(UNESCO), in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 94

(H. Hannum ed. 1984) (hereinafter HANNUM); Saba, UNESCO and Human Rights, in
2 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 401 (K. Vasak ed. 1982)

[hereinafter VASAK]; Swepston, Human Rights Complaint Procedures of the International Labor Organization, in HANNUM, supra, at 74; Valticos, The InternationalLabour Organization,in VASAK, supra, at 363.
2. The term "international human rights regimes" and its correlates are used here
interchangeably with the term "international human rights systems" and its correlates, in
keeping with the standard definition of "international regimes" recommended by Professor Stephen Krasner, to wit, the "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area." Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L
ORG. 185, 185 (1982).
For applications of the concept of regimes to international human rights, see Donnelly,
InternationalHuman Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599 (1986); FORSYTHE, A NEw HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME: WHAT SIGNIFICANCE? (unpublished manu-

script presented at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association,
March 1981); Onuf & Peterson, Human Rights from an InternationalRegimes Perspective, 38 J. INT'L AFF. 329 (1984); Ruggie, Human Rights and the Future International Community, 112 DAEDALUS 93 (1983).
3. Asia has done relatively little to establish regional human rights institutions. As
one commentator has observed:
Asia is a conglomeration of countries with radically different social structures,
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far as to create enforcement mechanisms within the framework of a
human rights charter, as evidenced by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms4 and the European Social Charter,5 the American Convention on Human Rights' and
the Banjul (African) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.7 The Permanent Arab Commission on Human Rights, founded by the Council of
the League of Arab States in September 19688 but since then understandably preoccupied by the rights of Palestinian Arabs in and to theand diverse religious, philosophical, and cultural traditions; their political ideologies, legal systems, and degrees of economic development vary greatly; and, above
all, there is no shared historical past even from the times of colonialism. Most
research on human rights problems in Asia has, therefore, been national rather
than regional.
Yamane, Asia and Human Rights, in VASAK, supra note 1, at 651.
On the other hand, the United Nations has encouraged the Asian region, so far unsuccessfully, to begin some sort of human rights initiative (see, e.g., infra text accompanying
notes 22-24), and certain nongovernmental organizations have provided some stimulus by
holding conferences to discuss regional human rights issues. In addition, the Standing
Committee of Lawasia (a professional association of Asian and Western Pacific lawyers)
is working to secure the ratification of the two United Nations human rights covenants
(see infra notes 18-19) and to establish a Center for Human Rights in the region. For
recent discussion regarding these developments, see generally Yamane, Approaches to
Human Rights in Asia, in INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 99 (R.
Bernhardt & J. Jolowicz eds. 1987) [hereinafter BERNHARDT & JOLOWICZ].
4. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force, Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention]. Eight protocols supplement the European Convention, six of
which have entered into force: Protocol (No. I), Mar. 20, 1952, Europ. T.S. No. 9 (entered into force, May 18, 1954) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol (No. II), May 6, 1963,
Europ. T.S. No. 44 (entered into force, Sept. 21, 1970) [hereinafter Protocol II]; Protocol
(No. III), May 6, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 45 (entered into force, Sept. 21, 1970); Protocol
(No. IV), Sept. 16, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 46 (entered into force, May 2, 1968) [hereinafter Protocol IV]; Protocol (No. V), Jan. 20, 1966, Europ. T.S. No. 55 (entered into
force, Dec. 20, 1971); Protocol (No. VI), Europ. T.S. No. 114 (entered into force Mar.
1, 1985); Protocol (No. VII), Nov. 22, 1984, Europ. T.S. No. 117; Protocol (No. VIII),
Mar. 19, 1985, Europ. T.S. No. 118.
5. European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, Europ. T.S. No. 35 (entered into force,
Feb. 26, 1965) [hereinafter European Social Charter].
6. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, OAS T.S. No. 36, at 1,
OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673
(1970) (entered into force, July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention].
7. Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 28, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/
LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force, Oct.
21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter].
8. See Council of the Arab League, Res. 2443/48, Sept. 3, 1968.
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Israeli-occupied territories,9 has yet to bring a proposed Arab Convention on Human Rights to successful conclusion, and so far has tended to
function more in terms of the promotion than the protection of human
rights.1 0 Nevertheless, the regional development of human rights norms,
institutions and procedures is likely to grow. Already an important dynamic of international human rights law and policy, it is, in any event,
here to stay."'
From a progressive point of view, this proliferation of human rights
activity from the global to the regional plane must be seen as salutary.
The greater the dispersion of human rights initiatives, after all, the
greater the likelihood that international human rights and their challenge to traditional notions of state sovereignty will be taken seriously.
Yet, because the world community has seen fit to arrange for the advancement of human rights through the United Nations and its allied
agencies virtually from the United Nations' founding, and because the
United Nations system has worldwide competence, one may legitimately
ask why it has been deemed necessary or even desirable to arrange for
the advancement of human rights on a regional basis as well. It is, indeed, precisely this question that arose at the United Nations' beginning.
Because many believed regional approaches to human rights might detract from the perceived universality of human rights, the wisdom of encouraging the creation of regional human rights systems was to some
extent doubted. 12
9. For discussion of the human rights conditions of Arabs in the Israeli-occupied
territories, see, alternatively, Dinstein, Self-Determination and the Middle East, in
SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 43 (Y. Alexander & R. Friedlander eds. 1980); and Zeidan, A Human Rights Settlement: The West
Bank and Gaza, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 165 (G.
Shepherd & V. Nanda eds. 1985). See also REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS
GUILD 1977 MIDDLE EAST DELEGATION, TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS IN ISRAELIOCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA (1978).
10. For discussion of the background of the League of Arab States and the Permanent Arab Commission on Human Rights, see Boutros-Ghali, The League of Arab
States, in VASAK, supra note 1, at 575; Marks, La Commision permanente arabe des
droits de l'homme, 3 REV. DROIT DE L'HOMME [HUM. RTS. J.] 101 (1970). See also A.
ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 164-65 (2d ed. 1982).
11. One can find evidence supporting this proposition in the numerous specialized
human rights treaties that now supplement the European, American, and African Conventions. See, e.g., Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights, 8
HuM. RTS. L.J. 217 (1987).
12. See Vasak, Introduction, in VASAK, supra note 1, at 451 [hereinafter Vasak,
Introduction]. Of course, the United Nations Charter itself encouraged some degree of
regional initiative. See U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1, expressly stating that nothing in
the Charter precludes the creation of regional arrangements as long as they are consistent
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At least three interrelated responses to this doubt have influenced the
development of regional human rights systems, however. Each explains,
at any rate, why the idea of regional human rights regimes is no longer a
matter of real controversy.
First, regions (by which we mean geographic areas or units marked by
relatively high socioeconomic, cultural, political and juridical commonalities) 3 tend toward homogeneity. While by no means guaranteeing unanimity of viewpoint, this fact appears nonetheless to facilitate debate over
the substance of the rights to be protected, to assist in the development of
more or less familiar systems of redress and, consequently, to enhance
the actual promotion and protection of human rights. 4
Second, geographic proximity, like cultural propinquity, generally
leads to socioeconomic, environmental and security interdependence-which in turn helps to breed a reciprocal tolerance and mutual
forbearance (or, in any event, less concern over alliance conflict and
power balances) that can secure the cooperative transformation of universal proclamations of human rights into more-or-less concrete realities.
The development of human rights instruments and mechanisms among
states generally is facilitated when alliances based on common interests
are in place, and this circumstance not infrequently occurs at the regional level more than it does at the global. 5

with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
13.

For an early search into the meaning of "region" in the post-1945 world, includ-

ing a discussion of its definitional complexity, see B. RUSSETT,
GIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM:

90 (1967). See generally REGIONAL

A

INTERNATIONAL RE-

STUDY IN POLITICAL ECOLOGY

POLITICS AND WORLD ORDER

1-7, 167-

(R. Falk & S. Men-

dlovitz eds. 1973).

14. One author writes:
It . . . would appear that the regional approach holds, at least for the time
being, a greater promise of effectiveness. Why should this be so? For one thing,
political and cultural homogeneity are prerequisites for an effective human rights

system, and these are more likely to be found on the regional plane. Other preconditions for such a system include reasonably well-developed legal systems as well
as shared juridical traditions and institutions. Here again, smaller regional groupings of states are more likely to meet these requirements than the human rights
systems that are open to the entire international community.

Buergenthal, The American and European Conventions on Human Rights: Similarities
and Differences, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 155, 156 (1981) [hereinafter Buergenthal, Similarities and Differences]. Accord R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 548 (1979).
15. As A.H. Robertson explains:
A state cannot be forced to submit itself to a system of international control; it will
do so only if it has confidence in that system. It is much more likely to have such
confidence if the international machinery has been set up by a group of like-
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Finally, both geographic proximity and cultural propinquity make
more probable the investigation and remedying of violations. The proverbial "bottom line" to the promotion and protection of human rights is, as
with other kinds of legal claims, not merely the intention but also the
capacity to apply some sort of pressure on states to redress violations.
Regional human rights regimes are more likely than global ones to manifest this competence and, hence, are more likely to be effective in applying diplomatic, economic, and other sanctions in defense of human
rights."$
In any event, recognizing the advantages of a regional approach to
human rights and stirred by World War II Axis Power atrocities, both
the European and the American communities set out to create their own
human rights systems. Indeed, influenced by United Nations efforts to
articulate an "international bill of rights" (begun in 1946 and culminating in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 17 the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" and the
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights),1 9 the region-

minded countries, which are already its partners in a regional organisation, than if
this is not the case. Moreover, it will be willing to give greater powers to a regional organ of restricted membership, of which the other members are its friends
and neighbours, than to a world-wide organ in which it (and its allies) play a
proportionally smaller part.
A. ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 175. Accord Tucker, Regional Human Rights Models
in Europe and Africa: A Comparison, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 135, 139
(1983).
16. Tucker writes:
Neither sovereign states, which are autonomous, nor supranational human rights
organizations, which depend upon voluntary compliance, nor private organizations, which lack resources and enforcement mechanisms, however, can adequately
protect human rights. A protective mechanism is needed which will function at an
intermediate level, exercising authority which is broader than the sovereign state
yet closer to the affected communities than a global supranational organization.
This can be achieved through regional human rights organizations.
Tucker, supra note 15, at 139.
17. Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
18. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (entered into force, Jan. 3,
1976). The United States has signed but not ratified this Covenant as of this writing.
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976). The
United States has signed but not ratified this Covenant as of this writing.
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alization of human rights norms, institutions and procedures began even
before the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration in December 1948. Meeting in Bogoti in spring 1948, the Ninth International
Conference of American states proclaimed the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man;20 meeting in The Hague in May 1948,
the Congress of the European Movement announced that it would receive proposals for a European Charter of Human Rights.21
As the European and Inter-American systems evolved, United Nations
resistance to the idea of regional human rights regimes waned. In fact,
through an ad hoc study group, the United Nations actually considered
creating regional human rights regimes of its own.22 It ultimately concluded, however, that the Member States themselves bore the responsibility for forming regional human rights systems.2 3 Thus, in 1977, via
Resolution 32/127, the General Assembly asked states not belonging to
regional human rights regimes "to consider agreements with a view to
the establishment within their respective regions of suitable regional machinery for the promotion and protection of human rights."2 Shortly
thereafter, in 1979, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) called on the Secretary General of the OAU to draft an "African Charter on Human and Peoples'

20. OAS Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American
States (Mar. 30 - May 2, 1948), BogotA, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965).
Perhaps explaining the American Declaration's adoption a full seven months before
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the fact that elements of ongoing concern
for the international promotion and protection of human rights in the Americas can be
traced to the very origins of the inter-American system in 1826, when the Congress of
Panama, urged by Simon Bolivar to consider a confederation of Latin American States,
adopted the Treaty of Perpetual Union, League, and Confederation. While the proposed
Treaty was ratified only by Colombia and therefore never entered into force and effect, it
nonetheless recognized the principle of juridical equality of nationals of a state and foreigners. Also, the Contracting Parties pledged themselves to cooperate in the abolition of
the slave trade. See the Treaty of Perpetual Union, League and Confederation, Arts. 23
& 27, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES xxviii-xxxxiii (J.
Scott ed. 1931).
21. See A. ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 81.
22. See Vasak, Introduction, supra note 12, at 451-52.
23. Id.
24. G.A. Res. 32/127, 32 U.N. GAOR (105th plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/32/458
(1977), reprinted in 31 Y.B. U.N. 740 (1977). Two resolutions reiterating the plea of
the General Assembly followed this resolution. G.A. Res. 33/167, 33 U.N. GAOR (90th
plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/33/509 (1978), reprinted in 32 Y.B. U.N. 734 (1978), and
G.A. Res. 34/171, 34 U.N. GAOR (106th plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/34/829 (1979),
reprinted in 33 Y.B. U.N. 871 (1979).
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Rights. 112Thus began the regionalization of regimes designed to promote and
protect international human rights. In this Article, we first describe the
origins and structures of the European, Inter-American, and African
human rights regimes, noting especially the similarities and dissimilarities among them. Thereafter, although limited by the unattainability and
scarcity of certain data, we consider the effectiveness of each human
rights regime from the standpoint of their accessibility to victims of state
violation and from the standpoint of the admissibility of the human
rights grievances brought to them for judgment. We conclude with a few
thoughts about how the international community might improve the efficiency of the three human rights regimes.2"
II.

THE ORIGINS AND STRUCTURES OF THE REGIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS REGIMES

A.

The European Regime

The European human rights regime began following the entry into
force, in September 1953, of the European Convention for the Protection
27
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention).
The first regional human rights regime created, it was developed deliberately to safeguard against the revival of aggressive and repressive dictatorships by ensuring "the collective enforcement of certain of the rights
stated in the Universal Declaration [of Human Rights]. 2 8 It was

25. Decision 115 (XVI) Rev. 1, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/115 (XVI) (1979).
26. For earlier but less comprehensive comparative treatments, see Buergenthal, Similarities and Differences, supra note 14; Frowein, The European and the American
Conventions on Human Rights: A Comparison, 1 HUM. RTS. L.J. 44 (1980); Kunig,
Regional Protection of Human Rights: A Comparative Introduction, in P. KUNIG, W.
BENEDEK & C. MAHALU, REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE EMERGING AFRICAN SYSTEM

31 (1985); Tucker, supra note 15.

27.

European Convention, supra note 4. On the European human rights system, see
generally R. BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE: A STUDY OF THE MACHINERY
OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (1980); F. CASTBERG,
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1974); J. FAWCETT, THE APPLI-

(2d ed. 1987); F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1975); C. MORRISSON, THE
DEVELOPING EUROPEAN LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1967); PROTECTION OF HUMAN
CATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

RIGHTS IN EUROPE (I. Maier ed. 1982); A. ROBERTSON, supra note 10; P. VAN DIJK &
G. VAN HooF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN

RIGHTS (1984);

J.

WRIGHT, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: AN

ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL (1978).

28.

A. ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 82.
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thought that "[i]f the dictators had built their empire by suppressing individual freedoms, then an effective system for the protection of human
rights would constitute a bulwark against any recrudescence of
dictatorship." 29
Thus, pursuant to the European Convention, a series of additional
protocols"0 and the European Social Charter 31 (whose drafting began
immediately after the European Convention entered into force), the
Council of Europe (Council), led by a liberal-socialist coalition and believing that European institutions and values favored human rights, has
sought to guarantee a broad range of both "first generation" (civil and
political) and "second generation" (economic, social and cultural) rights.
Believing also that their relations were strong enough to withstand a
human rights regime based on reciprocal scrutiny, they have done so
through a combination of adjudicative and reportorial procedures within
the framework of the Council of Europe, 2 including a commission, a
court of human rights and certain of the administrative and parliamentary organs of the Council-all located in Strasbourg, France.
1. The European Convention
Together with its first and fourth additional protocols, 33 the European
Convention, in force and effect relative to all twenty-one Member States
of the Council of Europe,3 ' addresses primarily civil and political rights
and freedoms. 3 5 A broad nondiscrimination provision supplements these

29. Id. at 80.
30. European Convention, supra note 4.
31. European Social Charter, supra note 5.
32. The Council of Europe, the first Western European intergovernmental political
organization created after World War II, is a quasi-parliamentary organization of
twenty-one Western European States established in 1949 to promote cooperation and
unity among its members. Its Statute created, inter alia, a Committee of Ministers and a
Parliamentary Assembly. See, e.g., Vasak, The Council of Europe, in VASAK,supra note
1, at 457.
33. Protocols I and IV, supra note 4.
34. Austria (1958), Belgium (1955), Cyprus (1962), Denmark (1953), France
(1974), the Federal Republic of Germany (1952), Greece (1974), Iceland (1953), Ireland
(1953), Italy (1955), Liechtenstein (1982), Luxembourg (1953), Malta (1967), the
Netherlands (1954), Norway (1952), Portugal (1978), Spain (1979), Sweden (1952),
Switzerland (1974), Turkey (1954), and the United Kingdom (1951). See COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, YEARBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS App./Tab.

1 (1983).
35. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 2 (the right to life); art. 3 (the right to
humane treatment); art. 4 (freedom from slavery and involuntary servitude); art. 5 (the
right to personal liberty and security); art. 6 (the right to a fair trial); art. 7 (freedom
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declared rights and freedoms and secures their enjoyment "without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status."3' Also, to guarantee
these rights and freedoms, the Convention establishes two primary organs-the European Commission of Human Rights (European Commission)37 and the European Court of Human Rights (European
Court) 3 -and, in addition, frequently relies on the Council's Committee
of Ministers. 9
The European Commission is elected by the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe40 and presently consists of twenty-one members
(no two from the same state),41 each serving for a six-year term. 2 The
Commission's jurisdiction extends to inter-state applications automatically, without the express consent of the States Parties involved,43 and to
petitions by any person, group of individuals or nongovernmental organization (NGO) claiming to be the victim of a violation by a State Party to
the European Convention, provided that the respondent State Party has
made a declaration recognizing the Commission's competence to receive
such petitions."

from ex post facto laws); art. 8 (the right to privacy); art. 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion); art. 10 (freedom of expression); art. 11 (freedom of assembly and
association); art. 12 (the right to marriage and family); and art. 13 (the right to legal
protection).
Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 1 (the right to personal property); art. 2 (the right to free
choice of education); and art. 3 (the right to free elections).
Protocol IV, supra note 4, art. 1 (freedom from debtor prison); art. 2 (the right to free
movement and residence); art. 3 (freedom from national territorial expulsion); and art. 4
(freedom from the collective expulsion of aliens).
To compare the civil and political rights and freedoms articulated in the American
Convention of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
see infra notes 84 and 131.
36. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 14.
37. Id. art. 19(1).
38. Id. art. 19(2).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 62-66.
40. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 21.
41. Id. art. 20. "The Commission shall consist of a number of members equal to that
of the High Contracting Parties" (i.e., presently twenty-one). Id.
42. Id. arts. 22-23.
43. Id. art. 24.
44. Id. art. 25. As of this writing, twenty of the twenty-one States Parties had formally recognized the competence of the Commission to receive individual applications:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands (and the Dutch An-
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The Commission's duties are to determine the admissibility of applications, 4 5 to ascertain the facts concerning an application properly before
47
the Commission4" and to attempt "to secure a friendly settlement.1 If
the Commission cannot secure a friendly settlement, the European Convention directs it to report the facts and its opinion of the case to the
Council's Committee of Ministers and, optionally, to make recommendations to the Committee. 4'8 Alternatively, the Commission may bring suit
before the European Court of Human Rights' 9 provided, however, that
the respondent State Party has formally recognized the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. 50
The European Court-elected by the Consultative Assembly of the
Council of Europe for a renewable term of nine years51 and, like the
Commission, also consisting of twenty-one members (no two from the
same state), 52 all "of high moral character and . . .recognized competence" 5 3-has jurisdiction only over States Parties that have consented to
the Court's jurisdiction explicitly. 5 ' As of early 1987, twenty of the
twenty-one members of the Council had accepted the Court's compulsory
tilles), Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
See Letter from Professor Colin J. Warbrick to Burns H. Weston (Sept. 21, 1987) (discussing the status of the European Convention and indicating that all but Cyprus have
formally recognized the competence of the Commission to receive individual applications). See also Marie, supra note 11, at 226 (indicating that all but Malta, Cyprus and
Turkey had formally recognized the competence of the Commission to receive individual
applications).
45. Id. arts. 24-27.
46. Id. art. 28(a).
47. Id. art. 28(b).
48. Id. art. 31. Professor Kevin Boyle describes the process as follows:
Under article 31 of the Convention, the Commission is required to draw up a
report for the Committee of Ministers if no settlement is achieved ...
The report is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers and to the state concerned, which may not publish it, but not to the applicant. The applicant is, however, informed that a report has been adopted. After a three-month interval, the
Committee of Ministers decides whether a breach of the Convention has occurred
and whether to publish the Commission's report.

Boyle, Practice and Procedure on Individual Applications under the European Convention on Human Rights, in HANNUM, supra note 1, at 133, 148.
49. European Convention, supra note 4, arts. 44, 48.
50. Id. art. 46.
51. Id. arts. 39, 40.
52. Id. art. 38. "The European Court of Human Rights shall consist of a number of
judges equal to that of the Members of the Council of Europe" (i.e., presently twentyone). Id.
53. Id. art. 39(3).
54. Id. art. 48.
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jurisdiction. 55 For consideration of each case brought before it, the Court
sits as a "chamber" of only seven judges, six of whom the President of
the Court chooses. by lot before the opening of each case and the seventh
of whom is a concerned state national or other person sitting in ex officio
capacity chosen by the concerned State Party.56
The Court is directed to interpret and apply the European Convention
whenever cases are brought to it by the Commission or by a State
Party.57 Significantly, however, individuals have no official standing
before the Court; thus, to ensure fairness, the Commission has relied
increasingly on the input of individual complainants in its representation
of their cases before the Court, 58 and the Court, in turn, has made it
possible for counsel to represent individuals if the individuals so desire.5
In addition, although a judgment of the Court is both final and binding,60 the Court is not responsible for its execution. Indeed, the Court
lacks the capacity to execute a judgment. Instead, the Court is directed to
transmit a judgment to the Committee of Ministers which, in turn,
"shall supervise its execution."61
Finally, the Committee of Ministers, though not a creature of the European Convention and composed of persons who, unlike the members of
the Commission and Court, serve not in their individual capacity but as
governmental representatives, also plays a major role in the promotion
and protection of human rights under the European Convention and its
additional protocols. Indeed, as one commentator has suggested, the
Committee is the "ultimate guarantor of human rights under the [Euro-

55. Id. art. 46. Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the
Netherlands (and the Dutch Antilles), Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom. Missing is Turkey. Letter from Professor Colin J. Warbrick
to Burns H. Weston, supra note 44 (indicating that all but Turkey have accepted the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction). See also Marie, supra note 11, at 226 (indicating that
all but Turkey and Malta have accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction).
56. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 43.
57. Id. art. 45. In addition, the Court has a limited advisory jurisdiction. Pursuant to
Protocol II, supra note 4, the Committee of Ministers may request an advisory opinion
of the Court "concerning the interpretation of the Convention and the Protocols thereto."
See infra note 123.
58. Boyle, supra note 48, at 149. "[I]t has become the Commission's practice, sanctioned by the Court, to invite the applicant or lawyer to assist the Commission in both
the preparation and presentation of its case before the Court." Id.
59. See Mahoney, Developments in the Procedureof the European Court of Human
Rights: The Revised Rules of Courts, 3 Y. B. EUR. L. 127, 134-35 (1983).
60. European Convention, supra note 4, arts. 52, 53.
61. Id. art. 54.
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pean] Convention. '6 2 Absent the referral of an application to the Court
by the Commission or a concerned State Party, the Committee is responsible for deciding whether a breach of the European Convention has occurred. 3 Additionally, as indicated, the Committee is the sole organ
within the framework of the European human rights system with the
power to execute judgments,64 and in this capacity the Committee often
has passed resolutions requiring states to remedy proven violations.6 " It
has not yet actually imposed, however, the most serious sanction: expulsion from the Council of Europe.6"
2. The European Social Charter
The European human rights regime so far described, an adjudicative
process available only for applications and petitions claiming violations
of civil and political rights, is available for complaints brought pursuant
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention). By contrast, economic,
social and cultural rights-so-called second generation rights-are left to
be promoted and protected elsewhere, under the European Social Charter (Charter)6 7 and primarily by reportorial means.
Under the Charter, in force and effect relative to fourteen of the
twenty-one Member States of the Council of Europe," the States Parties

62. Boyle, supra note 48, at 135.
63. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 32(1). In order to establish a breach, a
consensus of two-thirds of the Committee must exist. Id.
64. Id. arts. 32(4), 54.
65. See Boyle, supra note 48, at 136.
66. On the other hand, following a military coup in Greece in 1967 and a subsequent history of severe human rights violations by the Greek junta that came to power, a
report of the Benelux and Nordic members of the Council of Europe condemning human
rights abuses in Greece did raise the specter of the explusion of Greece from the Council.
Greece withdrew from the Council, however, before this could happen and did not rejoin
until 1973 after political conditions in Greece had changed and Greece had moved to
comply with the Council's human rights demands, including the lifting of a declared state
of emergency, the release of political detainees, the restoration of human rights, and the
holding of elections under a genuinely democratic constitution.
67. European Social Charter, supra note 5.
68. Austria (1969), Cyprus (1968), Denmark (1965), France (1973), the Federal
Republic of Germany (1965), Greece (1984), Iceland (1976), Ireland (1965), Italy
(1965), the Netherlands (1980), Norway (1965), Spain (1980), Sweden (1965) and the
United Kingdom (1965). Missing are Belgium, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Switzerland and Turkey. See Marie, supra note 11, at 228; MULTILATERAL

53 (M. Bowman & D. Harris eds., 3rd Cum.
Supp. 1986). For background and analysis, see generally D. HARRIS, THE EUROPEAN
TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS
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undertake to consider the economic, social and cultural rights enumerated therein 9 "as a declaration of aims which [they] will pursue by all
appropriate means" 70 and to submit biennial progress reports to the
Council's Secretary-General concerning those substantive provisions "as
they have accepted." 17 1 A Committee of Experts, consisting of not more

than seven members nominated by the States Parties and appointed by
the Council's Committee of Ministers "from a list of independent experts
of the highest integrity and of recognized competence in international
social questions," examines the reports that the Secretary-General has
received. 72 A subcommittee of the Governmental Social Committee7

3

then

considers both the reports of the States Parties and the conclusions of the
Committee of Experts,7 and the Secretary-General submits the conclu-

(1984).
69. European Social Charter, supra note 5, pt. II, art. 1 (the right to work); art. 2
(the right to just conditions of work); art. 3 (the right to safe and healthy working conditions); art. 4 (the right to a fair remuneration); art. 5 (the right to organize); art. 6 (the
right to bargain collectively); art. 7 (the right of [employed] children and young persons
to protection); art. 8 (the right of employed women to protection); art. 9 (the right to
vocational guidance); art. 10 (the right to vocational training); art. 11 (the right to protection of health); art. 12 (the right to social security); art. 13 (the right to social and
medical assistance); art. 14 (the right to benefit from social welfare services); art. 15 (the
right of physically or mentally disabled persons to vocational training, rehabilitation, and
social resettlement); art. 16 (the right of the family to social, legal, and economic protection); art. 17 (the right of mothers to social and economic protection); art. 18 (the right to
engage in a gainful occupation in the territory of other contracting parties); and art. 19
(the right of migrant workers and their families to protection and assistance).
In addition, Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 2, states that "[n]o person shall be denied the
right to education."
To compare the economic, social, and cultural rights articulated in the American Convention and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, see infra notes 87 and
132.
70. European Social Charter, supra note 5, art. 20(1)(a).
71. Id. art. 21.
72. Id. art. 25.
73. According to article 27(2) of the European Social Charter:
The sub-committee shall be composed of one representative of each of the Contracting Parties. It shall invite no more than two international organisations of
employers and no more than two international trade union organisations as it may
designate to be represented as observers in a consultative capacity at its meetings.
Moreover, it may consult no more than two representatives of international nongovernmental organisations having consultative status with the Council of Europe,
in respect of questions with which the organisations are particularly qualified to
deal, such as social welfare, and the economic and social protection of the family.
Id. art. 27(2).
74. Id. art. 27(1).
SOCIAL CHARTER
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sions of the Committee of Experts to the Council's Consultative Assembly. 5 Ultimately, however, similar to its enforcement powers under the
European Convention relative to civil and political rights, the Committee
of Ministers is responsible for the promotion and protection of the economic, social and cultural rights that the Charter enumerates. Article 29
of the Charter provides that "the Committee of Ministers may, on the
basis of the report of the Sub-committee, and after consultation with the
Consultative Assembly, make to each Contracting Party any necessary
'
recommendations. " 7
B.

The Inter-American Regime

In 1948, concurrent with its establishment of the Organization of
American States (OAS), the Ninth International Conference of American states adopted the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties

of Man, 7 an instrument similar to, but coming a full seven months
before, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 8 Subsequently, in
1959, the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
created-under the auspices and within the framework of the OAS, by
means of a political resolution-the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, which since has undertaken important investigative activities concerning human rights in the Americas. 9 Finally, in 1969, the
Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, at a meeting
in San Jos6, Costa Rica, adopted the American Convention on Human

Rights (American Convention) 0 which, among other things, committed
the previously established OAS Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights to the implementation of the Convention.' The American Con-

75. Id. art. 28.
76. Id. art. 29.
77. Supra note 20. For a concise history of the Inter-American human rights system,
see T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D. SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE AMERICAS 1-26 (1986) [hereinafter T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D.
SHELTON].

78. Universal Declaration, supra note 17. In contrast to the Universal Declaration,
the American Declaration sets out the duties as well as the rights of the individual
citizen.
79. See 1 THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: TREATIES, CONVENTIONS AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS - PART

II, at 23 (F. Garcia-Amador ed. 1983).

80. American Convention, supra note 6.
81. Id. art. 33(a). The Inter-American Commission, created as early as 1959, was
not an organ of the OAS at its founding. Res. VIII, Final Act of the Fifth Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OAS Doc. OEA Ser. C/II.5 (1960A). The
Commission became a principal organ of the OAS in 1967 when the Protocol of Buenos
Aires reformed the OAS Charter. See infra note 88. Yet from its beginning, though its
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vention, also known as the Pact of San Jos6, entered into force on July
82
18, 1978, when Grenada became the eleventh State Party to the treaty,
thus setting into motion a regional human rights regime comparable to
the one already evolving in Europe."'

statutory authority was quite narrow, the Inter-American Commission liberally interpreted its powers to investigate allegations of human rights violations. See Norris, Observations In Loco: Practiceand Procedureof the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights: 1979-1983, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 285 (1984); Statute of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, art. 9, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. G/11 C-a-371 (1960), reprinted in T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D. SHELTON, supra note 77, at 5. The
limitations were altered when the Second Special Inter-American Conference passed a
resolution explicitly allowing the Commission to examine petitions as well as to interact
significantly with member States. See Buergenthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the
Protection of Human Rights, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 831 (1975) (discussing Res.
XXII, Organization of American States, Second Special Inter-American Conference, Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil, Nov. 17-30, 1965, Final Act, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.c/I.13/Final Act
at 32-34 (1965)). See also Peddicord, The American Convention on Human Rights:
PotentialDefects and Remedies, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 139 (1984). Additionally, in 1967
the Inter-American Commission was directed to protect as well as to promote human
rights. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2416,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 48, amended 21 U.S.T. 658, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, 729
U.N.T.S. 324, reprinted in I HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, Pt. 1,
at 1 (T. Buergenthal & R. Norris eds. 1978). See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES, THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: TEN YEARS OF Ac-

7 (1982).
82. As of this writing, twenty of the thirty-two OAS Member States have ratified the
American Convention: Argentina (1984), Barbados (1981), Bolivia (1979), Colombia
(1973), Costa Rica (1970), Dominican Republic (1978), Ecuador (1977), El Salvador
(1978), Grenada (1978), Guatemala (1978), Haiti (1977), Honduras (1977), Jamaica
(1978), Mexico (1981), Nicaragua (1979), Panama (1978), Peru (1978), Surinam
(1987), Uruguay (1985) and Venezuela (1977). See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
TIVITIES

STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

1985-1986, at 8 (1986); MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS,

supra note 68, at 63. Missing are Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, the United States and the
remaining English-speaking Caribbean nations.
83. For recent clear explication, see Buergenthal, The Inter-American System for the
Protectionof Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND
POLICY ISSUES 39 (T. Meron ed. 1984). See also T. BUERGENTHAL & R. NORRIS,
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (1982); T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D. SHELTON, supra note 77; L. LEBLANC, THE OAS AND THE PROMOTION AND
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1977); Symposium: The American Convention on
Human Rights, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1980); Buergenthal, Implementation in the InterAmerican Human Rights System, in BERNHARDT & JOLOWICZ, supra note 3, at 57
[hereinafter Buergenthal, Implementation].
One should note, however, that all the OAS Member States, regardless of whether or
not they have ratified the Convention, are obligated to observe the human rights of individuals as defined by the pre-existing American Declaration, supra note 20. See Statute
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Like the European Convention, the American Convention guarantees
a wide range of civil and political rights.8 4 Also, like the European Convention,8 5 a broad non-discrimination provision supplements these guarantees by ensuring the free and full exercise of the enumerated rights
and freedoms "without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
economic status, birth, or any other social condition." 8 6 Additionally,
reminiscent of the European Social Charter but without comparable detail, the American Convention obligates the States Parties to achieve progressively "the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the
87
Charter of the Organization of American States."
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.49, Doc. 6,
July 1, 1980, which provides that "[flor the purposes of this Statute, human rights are
understood to be ... [t]hose set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man in relation to [OAS] Member States" as well as "[t]hose set forth in the
American Convention on Human Rights in relation to the state parties thereto." Id. art.
1(2). As pointed out by Judge Buergenthal, the obligation derives from the OAS Charter. See Buergenthal, Implementation, supra, at 65-66.
84. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 3 (the right to juridical personality);
art. 4 (the right to life); art. 5 (the right to humane treatment); art. 6 (freedom from
slavery and involuntary servitude); art. 7 (the right to personal liberty); art. 8 (the right
to a fair trial); art. 9 (freedom from ex post facto laws); art. 10 (the right to compensation for miscarriage of justice); art. 11 (the right to privacy); art. 12 (freedom of conscience and religion); art. 13 (freedom of thought and expression); art. 14 (the right of
reply); art. 15 (the right of assembly); art. 16 (freedom of association); art. 17 (rights of
the family); art. 18 (the right to a name); art. 19 (rights of the child); art. 20 (the right to
nationality); art. 21 (the right to property); art. 22 (freedom of movement and residence);
art. 23 (the right to participate in government); art. 24 (the right to equal protection
before the law); and art. 25 (the right to judicial protection).
To compare the civil and political rights and freedoms articulated in the European
Convention and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, see supra note 35
and infra note 131.
85. Compare supra text accompanying note 36.
86. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(1).
87. Id. art. 26. The OAS Charter referred to is the 1948 Charter as amended by the
Protocol of Buenos Aires in 1967. See Charter of the Organization of American States,
Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2367, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OAS
Charter], and Protocol of Amendment, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847
[hereinafter Protocol of Amendment].
The economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural "standards" of the OAS
Charter are detailed in Chapters VII-IX thereof. The economic "standards" include:
increase in the per capita national product; equitable distribution of national income;
adequate and equitable systems of taxation; modernization of rural life in accordance
with equitable and efficient land-tenure systems; accelerated and diversified industrialization; stability in domestic pricing; fair wages, employment opportunities, and acceptable
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Also like the European Convention, the American Convention provides for two specialized-and comparable-enforcement mechanisms:
the above-mentioned, preexisting Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights,"8 headquartered at the OAS in Washington, D.C.; and
an Inter-American Court of Human Rights,"' situated in San Jos6,
Costa Rica. Each is accorded "competence with respect to matters relating to the fulfillment of the commitments made by the States Parties to
[the American] Convention."" ° In addition, resembling the functions of
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe within the European human rights regime,91 the General Assembly of the OAS plays an
important role.9"
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, composed of
seven members (no two from the same state) elected in their personal

working conditions; rapid eradication of illiteracy and expansion of educational opportunities; extension and application of modern medical science; proper nutrition; adequate
housing; healthful urban conditions; promotion of socially responsible private enterprise;
and expansion and diversification of exports. OAS Charter, supra, art. 31. The social
"standards"include: a nondiscriminatory right to material well-being and spiritual development; a right to work; a right to collective bargaining; fair and efficient systems and
procedures for economic consultation and collaboration; operation of socially responsible
systems of public administration, banking and credit, enterprise, and distribution and
sales; incorporation and increasing participation in society of the marginal sectors of the
population; recognition of the importance of labor unions, cooperatives, and professional
and community associations; development of an efficient social security policy; and adequate legal aid for all persons. Id. art. 43. The educational, scientific and cultural
"standards" include: encouragement of education, science, and culture in development
plans; Member State cooperation in meeting educational needs, promoting scientific research, encouraging technological progress, and preserving and enriching the cultural
heritage of their peoples; ensuring the effective exercise of the right to education; and
giving special attention to the eradication of illiteracy and the strengthening of adult and
vocational educational systems. Id. arts. 45-48.
One should note, in addition, that the OAS is currently considering a draft treaty
dealing with economic, social and cultural rights-to be presented to the 1987 OAS General Assembly-which, if adopted, will supersede all of the above. See Preliminary Draft
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, OEA/SER.P/AG
Doc. 1656/83, at 17.
To compare the economic, social, and cultural rights articulated in the European Convention and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, see supra note 69 and
infra note 132.
88. American Convention, supra note 6, arts. 33(a), 34-51. For pertinent historical
discussion, see supra note 83.
89. Id. arts. 33(b), 52-69.
90. Id. art. 33.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 115-16.
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capacities by the Member States of the OAS General Assembly for a
one-time renewable term of four years, 93 has a dual role, one as an organ of the American Convention and the other, an older role, as an organ of the OAS, with the OAS Charter94 and the American Declaration9 5 as its normative instruments. Thomas Buergenthal, former
President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, on which he
still sits, comments on this dual role:
As [an O.A.S.] Charter organ, the Commission has jurisdiction over all
O.A.S. Member States, whether or not they have ratified the Convention;
as a Convention organ, its jurisdiction extends only to the States Parties to
the Convention. Here its jurisdiction is more specific and its powers more
extensive. The powers of the Commission as Charter organ lack precision,
which is just as well, for the ambiguities about the scope of its powers
gave it greater flexibility to deal imaginatively with gross violations of
human rights prior to the entry into force of the Convention. It retains
that flexibility in dealing with states that have not ratified it and in responding to emergency situations involving large-scale human rights
abuses in the region."6
In any event, under the American Convention the main function of the
Inter-American Commission is to "promote respect for and defense of
human rights."9' 7 This purpose is to be accomplished, according to the
American Convention, by developing awareness of human rights, making
recommendations to OAS Member States, preparing studies or reports,
requesting information from OAS Member States, responding to and advising OAS Member States on matters relating to human rights and submitting annual reports to the OAS General Assembly.98 Also, it is to be
accomplished by taking action on petitions and other communications,99
a function the Convention details at some length. Like the European
Commission, the American Commission is directed to determine the admissibility of individual (private) petitions, 0 0 to undertake fact-finding

93. American Convention, supra note 6, arts. 36, 37.
94. Supra note 81.
95. Supra note 20.
96. Buergenthal, Human Rights in the Americas: View from the Inter-American
Court, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 303, 306-07 (1987) [hereinafter Buergenthal, View from the
Inter-American Court].
97. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 41. For related pertinent comment indicating other Commission functions, see infra text accompanying notes 126-27.
98. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 41.
99. Id.
100. Id. arts. 46, 47.
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and attempt friendly settlements,1 ' to report to the OAS Secretary General as well as to the parties involved, for publication, about the facts
and the solution reached if it achieves a friendly settlement and, if it fails
to achieve a friendly settlement, to prepare a confidential report and,
optionally, to tender proposals and recommendations 0 2 and submit cases
to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. °3 In addition, the Commission is charged to receive and review annual reports from the States
Parties so as to monitor progress relative to economic, social and cultural
rights.1 'O
The Inter-American Court, like the Commission, consists of seven
members (no two from the same state) elected in individual capacity, for
a renewable term of six years, by the States Parties to the Convention
"from among jurists of the highest moral authority and . . . recognized
competence in the field of human rights." 0 5 It is directed to interpret
and apply the American Convention in both contentious and advisory
jurisdiction.'
In exercising its contentious jurisdiction, however, which
may result in an order for compensatory damages, permanent or temporary injunctive relief, or both,' the Court is accessible only to the InterAmerican Commission'0 8 and to those States Parties to the American
Convention that, like their European counterparts, have expressly recognized such jurisdiction.' 0 9 As in the European human rights regime, in-

101. Id. art. 48.
102. Id. art. 50.
103. Id. art. 61.
104. Id. art. 42. One also should mention article 43, which requires the States Parties "to provide the Commission with such information as it may request of them as to
the manner in which their domestic law ensures the effective application of any provision
of this Convention." Id.
Former President of the Inter-American Commission, Professor Tom Farer, observes
that the country reports, which "usually deal . ..with civil, political, economic, and
social rights" as well as with the observance of personal security rights enumerated in the
Commission's statute, "have multiplied dramatically" since 1974. T. FARER, THE
GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA

T.

171 (1987) [hereinafter

FARER, GRAND STRATEGY].

105. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 52.
106. Article 62 of the Convention defines the contentious jurisdiction of the Court.
Id. art. 62. Article 64 defines its advisory jurisdiction. Id. art. 64.
107. Id. arts. 63(1), (2). According to Judge Buergenthal, writing in 1987, the authority to grant temporary injunctions has not yet been utilized. See Buergenthal, Implementation, supra note 83, at 71.
108. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 61(1).
109. Id. art. 62(3). As of this writing, ten of the nineteen States Parties to the American Convention have accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction: Argentina, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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dividuals have no formal standing before the Court"--they have standing only before the Commission, which alone may file an individual's
case with the Court, provided the Commission has completed its proceedings applicable to the case."' Also, as in Europe, and notwithstanding
that all judgments rendered pursuant to the Court's contentious jurisdiction are "final and not subject to appeal,""' 2 the Court lacks the power
to enforce its judgments and preliminary rulings; instead, it must rely
mainly on the OAS General Assembly (just as the European Court must
rely on the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers)." 3 In exercising its advisory jurisdiction, on the other hand, the Court is open not
only to the States Parties to the Convention and to the Inter-American
Commission, but also to all Member States of the OAS (including nonStates Parties to the Convention, such as the United States) and to the
OAS and all its organs as well (including, obviously, the
Commission)." 4
Finally, the OAS General Assembly, though a creature of the OAS
Charter and not the American Convention, also plays an important role
in the promotion and protection of human rights under the American
Convention. To quote Judge Buergenthal: "The Assembly is the principal organ of the [O.A.S.] whose human rights powers have their source
5
both in in the O.A.S. Charter and in the [American] Convention.""1
The annual reports that the Court must submit to the General Assembly, specifying "in particular, the cases in which a state has not complied
with its [the Court's] judgment, making any pertinent recommendations,""' thus take on added significance. The General Assembly's freedom to discuss the matter and to adopt whatever OAS sanctions it deems
appropriate at least partially mitigates the Court's incapacity to enforce
its judgments and rulings.
Thus, the core structure of the Inter-American human rights system is
similar to that of its European counterpart. Some significant differences
exist, however, and four stand out in particular.

See

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,

supra note 82, at 8.

110. But see supra text accompanying notes 58 and 59 for indication of the European Court's relaxation of this restriction.
111. For pertinent discussion, see In the Matter of Viviana Gallardo, et al. (Government of Costa Rica), Inter-American Court of Human Rights, No. G.101/81 (Nov. 13,
1981), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1424 (1981).
112. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 67.
113. Id. art. 65.
114. Id. art. 64.
115. Buergenthal, Implementation, supra note 83, at 58.
116. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 65.
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First, reminiscent of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man,"' albeit with little apparent practical significance, the
American Convention, unlike the European Convention, details individual duties as well as individual rights. Thus article 32 (entitled "Relationship Between Duties and Rights") reads:
1. Every person has responsibilities to his family, his community, and
mankind.
2. The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the
security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society.
Comparable obligation language exists also in the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights.1 1
Second, relative to individual petitions and complaints by one State
Party against another, the American Convention reverses the approach
taken under the European Convention. Whereas Europe utilizes a
mandatory inter-state complaint and optional individual petition procedure, the Americas utilize an optional inter-state complaint and
mandatory individual petition procedure. In contrast to the European
Commission of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights has authority to consider inter-state complaints only if
both of the States Parties, in addition to ratifying the Convention, have
formally recognized the competence of the Commission to receive and
review such complaints.1 9 On the other hand, the Commission may accept a private individual petition against any state simply on the basis of
the respondent state being a party to the American Convention.120 In
addition, unlike the European Convention, the American Convention
does not limit the right to file individual petitions only to victims of violations, leaving the process open to almost everyone. 2 '
117. Supra note 20. The American Convention also addresses duties. See infra text
accompanying note 118.
118. See infra text accompanying note 136.
119. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 45.
120. Id. art. 44.
121. Christina M. Cerna, Staff Attorney at the Inter-American Commission,
comments:
We have the broadest standing requirement of any international body, and anyone
may file a case before the Inter-American Commission. There is one exception.
Unlike the European Commission, we do not take petitions from companies, only
from persons.. . . Additionally, one need not be a victim or related to a victim to
present a petition to the Commission. Anyone can present a petition based on a
violation of human rights, provided that the right is included in the catalogue of
rights either in the American Declaration or in the American Convention.
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Third, and as already noted, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has advisory as well as contentious jurisdiction, 2 2 whereas the
European Court, while also possessed of advisory jurisdiction, is more
constricted in this respect.1 23 The Inter-American Court's advisory juris12
diction, defined in article 64 of the American Convention, is extensive.
As Judge Buergenthal explains:
An analysis of art. 64 indicates, first, that standing to request an advisory
opinion from the Court is not limited to the States Parties to the Convention; any O.A.S. Member State may seek it. Second, the advisory jurisdiction is not limited to interpretations of the Convention; it also extends to
interpretations of any other treaty "concerning the protection of human
rights in the American states." Third, all O.A.S. organs, including the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, have standing to request
advisory opinions. Fourth, all Member States of the O.A.S. may seek advisory opinions from the Court regarding the compatibility of their domestic laws with the Convention or any of the aforementioned human rights
treaties.' 2"

Cerna, The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 311,
316 (1987).
Judge Buergenthal explains the mandatory Western Hemispheric approach to individual petitions as follows:
The drafters of the American Convention opted for this approach in part because of Latin America's historical opposition to, and experience with, governmental intervention in the internal affairs of other governments. The solution they
adopted makes considerable sense. Experience with inter-state complaints indicates
that they contribute to the politicization of the human rights enforcement process.
A variety of political factors enters into a government's decision whether to file a
human rights complaint against another government. These may or may not have
anything to do with a concern for human rights or the interests of individual
victims.
Buergenthal, Similarities and Differences, supra note 14, at 160.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 105-14.
123. Under Protocol II, supra note 4, the European Court may render advisory
opinions on legal questions concerning interpretations of the Convention and the protocols. However, it can render these opinions only at the request of the Committee of
Ministers, and the question cannot involve the content or scope of the rights granted
under the Convention. In addition, the European Court may not give an opinion if it
concerns substantive questions that may appear before the European Commission, the
Committee of Ministers, or the Court itself. See J. WRIGHT, supra note 27, at 118.
124. Buergenthal, Implementation, supra note 83, at 72. For more extensive treatment of the advisory practice of the Inter-American Court, see Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(1985) [hereinafter Buergenthal, Advisory Practice].
125. Buergenthal, Implementation, supra note 83, at 72.
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Until recently the Inter-American Court has decided all cases referred to
it pursuant to its advisory jurisdiction.
Finally, both the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American
Court (but especially the Commission) operate beyond as well as within
the framework of the American Convention. The Commission is as much
an organ of the OAS Charter as it is of the American Convention, with
powers and procedures that differ significantly depending on the source
of the Commission's authority, particularly in relation to human rights
petitions and communications.' 2 The Court, while primarily an organ
of the Convention, nonetheless has jurisdiction to interpret human rights
provisions of treaties other than the American Convention, including the
12 7
human rights provisions of the OAS Charter.
C.

The African Regime

In 1981, following twenty years of pleas by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, interested states, nongovernmental organizations and others, adopted at the Eighteenth Assembly of Heads of State
and Government of the OAU the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 2 ' formally known as "the Banjul Charter on Human and
126.
Parties to the Convention are subject to the petition procedure set forth in article
19(a) of the Statute [of the Commission], pursuant to articles 44-51 of the Convention, while other Member States continue to be subject to the former procedure of
the [Commission], preserved in its basic form in article 20 of the Statute ...
The principal difference between the remedies available under either procedure
is that petitions brought against state parties may eventually be referred to the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights for a binding decision, if the state concerned has accepted the Court's jurisdiction ...
The relevant human rights are those defined by the American Convention on
Human Rights in the case of parties to the Convention and those found in the
1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in the case of nonparty states.
Norris, The Individual Petition Procedure of of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, in HANNUM, supra note 1, at 108-09 [hereinafter Norris,
Individual Petition Procedure].
For pertinent discussion, see Shelton, Implementation Procedures of the American
Convention on Human Rights, 26 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 238 (1983). See also supra note
83.
127. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 64. For pertinent discussion, see Buergenthal, Advisory Practice,supra note 124, at 3-15.
128. African Charter, supra note 7. For pertinent historical background, see P.
KUNIG, W. BENEDEK & C. MAHALU, REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY
INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE EMERGING AFRICAN SYSTEM (1985); E. MBAYA, LA
CHARTE AFRICIANE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DES PEUPLES: MYTHS ET REAL-
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Peoples' Rights."1 29 The Charter entered into force on October 21, 1986,
and, as of this writing, thirty-one of the fifty OAU Member States have
ratified it. 130
Like its European and Inter-American counterparts, the African
Charter provides for both "first generation" (civil and political) rights...

ITES

(1984); Aluko, The Organizationof African Unity and Human Rights, 70 ROUND
235 (1981); Balonda, African Charteron Human and Peoples' Rights, in NEW

TABLE

PERSPECTIVES AND CONCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN AFRO-EUROPEAN DIALOGUE

134 (K. Ginther & W. Benedek eds. 1983); Esiemokhai, Towards Adequate

Defense of Human Rights in Africa, 24 Q. J. ADMIN. 451 (1980); Gittleman, African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Prospects and Procedures, in HANNUM,
supra note 1, at 153 [hereinafter Gittleman, Prospects and Procedures];Gittleman, The
INT'L L.
667 (1982) [hereinafter Gittleman, Legal Analysis]; Kannyo, The Banjul Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights: Genesis and Political Background, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DEVELOPMENT (C. Welch, Jr. & R. Meltzer eds. 1984); Kunig, The Protection of
Human Rights by InternationalLaw in Africa, 25 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 138 (1982);
Lihau, Comments on the Banjul Charter,11 HUM. Rrs. INTERNET REP., Nov. 1986, at

African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis, 22 VA. J.

12, 14; Mbaya, La Charte Afrique en tant que mkcanisme de protection des droits de
l'homme, in BERNHARDT & JOLOWICZ, supra note 3, at 77; Ojo & Sesay, The O.A.U.
and Human Rights: Prospectsfor the 1980s and Beyond, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 89 (1986);
Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
902 (1983). For pertinent cultural background, see Cobbah, African Values and the
Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective, 9 HuM. RTS. Q. 309, 322 (1987).
129. The drafting of the Charter was completed at an OAU Ministerial Meeting,
Banjul, The Gambia, January 7-19, 1981.
130. Benin (1986), Botswana (1986), Burkina Faso (1984), Central African Republic (1986), Chad (1986), Comoros (1986), Congo (1982), Egypt (1984), Gabon (1986),
Gambia (1983), Guinea (1982), Guinea-Bissau (1985), Liberia (1982), Mali (1981),
Mauritania ("no date"), Niger (1986), Nigeria (1983), Rwanda (1983), Saharawi Arab
Democratic Republic (1986), Sao Tome & Principe (1986), Senegal (1982), Sierra Leone (1983), Somalia (1985), Sudan (1986), Tanzania (1984), Togo (1982), and Tunisia
(1983), Uganda (1984), Zambia (1984) and Zimbabwe (1986). In addition, Algeria,
Cape Verde, Lesotho and Libya have signed the Charter, thus leaving fifteen African
States that have neither signed nor ratified the Charter. See Banjul CharterComes Into
Force, 11 HuM. RTS. INTERNET REP., Sept. 1986, at 46.
131. African Charter, supra note 7, art. 3 (the right to equal protection before the
law); art. 4 (the right to life); art. 5 (the right to humane treatment, including freedom
from slavery); art. 6 (the right to personal liberty and security); art. 7 (the right to a fair
trial, legal protection, and freedom from ex postfacto laws); art. 8 (freedom of conscience
and religion); art. 9 (the right to information and freedom of expression); art. 10 (the
right to free association); art. 11 (the right to assembly); art. 12 (freedom of movement
and residence, freedom from national territorial expulsion, and freedom from the collective expulsion of non-nationals); art. 13 (the right to participate in government and free
elections and of equal access to public property and services); art. 14 (the right to property); and art. 18 (the right to marriage and family).
Notably absent from the foregoing list of rights is the right to privacy. Probably this is
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and "second generation" (economic, social, and cultural) rights.13 2 Also
resembling its European and Inter-American predecessors, it ensures the
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms that the Charter recognizes and
guarantees "without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group,
color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and
social origin, fortune, birth, or other status."1 33 In addition, reminiscent
of, but going beyond the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties
of Man"' and the American Convention,'3 5 it details individual duties
as well as individual rights-to the family, society, the state, and the
international African community."3 '
In contrast to its European and Inter-American counterparts, however-indeed, going distinctively beyond them-the African Charter recognizes the rights of "peoples," or so-called third generation or solidarity
rights, to wit: the right of all peoples to equality without "domination of
a people by another"; 3 7 the right of all peoples to existence and selfdetermination; 8' the right of all peoples to freely dispose of "their
wealth and natural resources"; 3 9 the right of all peoples to their economic, social and cultural development, including "equal enjoyment of
the common heritage of mankind";14 0 the right of all peoples to national

due to African customs and traditions that see human identity more in group than individual terms. As Josiah Cobbah has recently written, "The pursuit of human dignity is
not concerned with vindicating the right of any individual against the world. The African
notion of family seeks a vindication of the communal well-being. The starting point is
not the individual but the whole group including both the living and the dead." Cobbah,
supra note 128, at 322.
To compare the civil and political rights and freedoms articulated in the European
Convention and the American Convention, see supra notes 35 and 84.
132. African Charter, supra note 7, art. 15 (the right to work); art. 16 (the right to
physical and mental health); art. 17 (the right to education and to cultural participation);
and art. 18 (the right to family assistance and to protection of women, children, the aged,
and disabled).
To compare the economic, social, and cultural rights articulated in the European Convention and the American Convention, see supra notes 69 and 87.
133. African Charter, supra note 7, art. 2.
134. See supra note 20.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
136. African Charter, supra note 7, arts. 27-29. For related discussion, see supra
text accompanying note 118.
137. African Charter, supra note 7, art. 19.
138. Id. art. 20.
139. Id. art. 21.
140. Id. art. 22. The term "common heritage of mankind," originally used in conjunction with the resources of the deep seabed, is now understood to embrace shared
Earth-space resources; scientific, technical, and other information and progress; and cul-
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and international peace and security;"' and the right of all peoples to "a
general satisfactory environment favorable to their development." 14 2 The
States Parties to the Charter undertake to promote and ensure, through
"teaching, education and publication," respect for and understanding of
these rights and freedoms together with the first and second generation
rights and freedoms that the Charter enumerates.""
Similarities and differences with the European and American human
rights regimes are evident also in the enforcement mechanisms and procedures that the African Charter embraces for the purpose of promoting
and protecting the rights and freedoms it recognizes and guarantees. In
contrast to its European and Inter-American counterparts, for example,
it does not provide for a court of human rights. Commentators have
stated that African customs and traditions favor mediation, conciliation
and consensus over the adversarial and adjudicative procedures common
to Western legal systems.1 44 Like its European and American counter1 45
parts, however, it does provide for the establishment of a commission.
Known as the "African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1 46
it exists within the framework of the OAU1 47 and consists of eleven
members (no two from the same state) elected in their personal capacities1 48 by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government 49 for a
renewable term of six years.1

50

Its purpose is "to promote human and

peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa." 51
To these ends, the Commission is authorized to promote human and
peoples' rights by various informational, educational, prescriptive and
cooperative means;1 52 to ensure their protection pursuant to the Charter

tural traditions, sites and monuments. See Weston, Human Rights, 20 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 714, 717 (15th ed., 1986 Printing).
141. African Charter, supra note 7, art. 23.
142. Id. art. 24.
143. Id. art. 25. For comment critical of the "peoples" or "third generation" rights
set forth in the African Charter, see Partsch, The Enforcement of Human Rights and
Peoples' Rights: Observations On Their Reciprocal Relations, in BERNHARDT &
JOLOWiCZ, supra note 3, at 25.
144. See, e.g., Gittleman, Legal Analysis, supra note 128, at 674.
145. African Charter, supra note 7, art. 30.
146. Id.
147. Article 30 of the African Charter states explicitly that the Commission "shall be
established within the Organization of African Unity." Id.
148. Id. arts. 31, 32.
149. Id. art. 33.
150. Id. art. 36.
151. Id. art. 30.
152. To serve its promotional function, the Commission is mandated, under article
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(in its contentious jurisdiction);15 to interpret the Charter at the request
of a State Party, an institution of the OAU or an African organization
recognized by the OAU (in its advisory capacity);154 and to "[plerform
any other tasks which may be entrusted to it by the [OAU] Assembly of
Heads of State and Government."1'55 Additionally, in its contentious jurisdiction, the Commission may resort "to any appropriate method of
investigation"' 56 and receive, investigate, report on and make recommendations concerning both inter-state complaints of alleged violations of the
Charter' 57 and private (individual) "communications" of alleged violations of the Charter,1 58 the latter being in no way limited to victims of
violations.1 59 Legally competent to preside over both public and private
human rights complaints, the African Commission is thus comparable to
its European and Inter-American counterparts. However, because this

45(1) of the Charter:
a) to collect documents, undertake studies and researches on African problems in
the field of human and peoples' rights, organize seminars, symposia and conferences, disseminate information, encourage national and local institutions concerned
with human and peoples' rights, and [sic] should the case arise, give its views or
make recommendations to Governments.
b) to formulate and lay down, [sic] principles and rules aimed at solving legal
problems relating to human and peoples' rights and fundamental freedoms upon
which African Governments may base their legislations. [sic]
c) co-operate with other African and international institutions concerned with the
promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights.
African Charter, supra note 7, art. 45(1).
153. Id. art. 45(2).
154. Id. art. 45(3). In this advisory capacity the African Commission resembles the
advisory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. See supra text accompanying note 114.
155. African Charter, supra note 7, art. 45(4).
156. Id. art. 46.
157. Id. arts. 47-54. There are two methods by which a State Party can bring a
human rights complaint to the attention of the Commission. The first is unique to the
African system-that is, the petitioner state has the option of initially contacting the
alleged violator state outside the Commission process in order to attempt bilateral settlement of the matter. Id. art. 47. If unsuccessful, the petitioner state then can apply directly to the Commission. Id. art. 48. Alternatively, the petitioner state can directly apply
to the Commission without attempting a bilateral settlement. Id. art. 49.
158. Id. arts. 55-59.
159. Article 46 of the African Charter reads in part: "The Commission . . . may
hear from the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity or any other
person capable of enlightening it" (emphasis added). Id. art. 46. In this openness to
communications from all quarters, the African system is thus akin more to the InterAmerican than the European system, which limits the right to file individual petitions to
victims of violations. See supra text accompanying note 121.
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legal competency is conditional almost entirely on the concerned states
being parties to the African Charter,16 ° the African Commission also is
distinctive. Whereas the European regime favors a mandatory inter-state
complaint and optional individual petition procedure and the American
regime favors an optional inter-state complaint and mandatory individual petition procedure, 161 the African regime opts for a mandatory ap162
proach in both instances.

The African Commission is distinctive, finally, in yet another
way-again, it seems, as a consequence of African customs and traditions. Like the European and Inter-American Commissions, the African
Commission, after determining an application to be admissible, is expected, in its contentious jurisdiction, to undertake fact-finding, attempt
an amicable settlement, prepare a report and, generally in its discretion,
make recommendations 63 (to the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and
Government). 6 Beyond these procedural steps, however, in the absence
of a human rights court to which it might make further appeals and
through which enforceable decisions might be rendered, the Commission
(and, therefore, the concerned state and private parties) has little recourse. As a consequence its emphasis is on mediation, conciliation and
consensus as opposed to adversarial processes.1 5 In contrast to its European and Inter-American counterparts, the African Commission is expected to function more in a reportorial than an adjudicative fashion.
All of this suggests, of course, that the African Commission may prove
less effective than its European and Inter-American counterparts in
guarding against and correcting human rights abuses. The principle of
state sovereignty or domestic jurisdiction is not easily surmounted even
under the best of circumstances. On the other hand, given the African
Commission's deliberate creation as an organ of the OAU"6 ' and its con-

160.

This condition is expressly indicated relative to inter-state complaints but only

implied in the case of private communications. See African Charter, supra note 7, arts.
47, 55. For related discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 204-06.
161. See supra text accompanying note 119.
162. However, the African Commission may examine communications from private
individuals and non-governmental institutions and groups only if the OAU Assembly of
Heads of State and Government so request and only if a majority of the Commission so
decides. See African Charter, supra note 7, arts. 55, 58. For related discussion, see infra
text accompanying notes 204-06.
163. See supra notes 46-47 (pertaining to the European Commission) & 101 (pertaining to the Inter-American Commission) and accompanying texts.
164. African Charter, supra note 7, arts. 53, 58.
165. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 144.
166. See supra text accompanying note 147.
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sequent intended close relationship to the OAU Assembly of Heads of
State and Government (analogous to the European Commission's affiliation with the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and the
Inter-American Commission's ties to the General Assembly of the
OAS), 167 the case reports it must submit to the OAU Assembly and the
periodic activity reports it must likewise submit16 naturally could take
on added significance. With the OAU Assembly free to adopt whatever
sanctions it deems appropriate, the African Commission's relatively limited capacity to act on its findings could be at least partially mitigated.
Of course, given the inexperience of the African regime, it remains to be
seen how the Commission and the OAU Assembly will act.
III.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REGIONAL REGIMES

From a humanistic standpoint, the European, Inter-American and African human rights regimes hold out great promise. However favorably
or unfavorably they may compare to some ideal human rights system or
to each other, the rights they recognize, the institutions they establish
and the procedures they prescribe add up to an assault on the global
state sovereignty system that is of truly historic proportions*'6 International relations, it seems, are at long last beginning to be conducted, in
theory and on the regional plane at least, as if people-not only
states-really mattered.1""
But how good is the promise in fact? How effective are the three regional regimes in actuality, or how effective might they realistically be,
in safeguarding the human rights they are designed to promote and
protect?
We consider this question briefly, first, from the standpoint of the accessibility of each regime to those persons whose rights are alleged to be
violated, a threshold issue that ordinarily does not affect state-to-state
complaints but one that clearly impacts on individual petitions; and second, from the standpoint of the admissibility of the human rights griev167. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66 & 115-16.
168. African Charter, supra note 7, art. 54: "The Commission shall submit to each
ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government a report on its
activities."
169. See generally Weston, supra note 140.
170. See Preiswerk, Could We Study InternationalRelations as if People Mattered?
(prepared for the 50th Anniversary of the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1977) (noting E. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: A STUDY OF EcoNOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED (1974)) in TRANSNATIONAL ACADEMIC PROGRAM,
INSTITUTE FOR WORLD ORDER, PEACE AND WORLD ORDER STUDIES: A CURRICULUM
GUIDE 2, 3 (1981).
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ances brought for judgment, an issue that affects inter-state and private
complaints in common but not identically. Each of these issues is fundamental to the larger question of effectiveness. If entry to the regime is in
some way foreclosed or if the constraints on admissibility are unduly
rigid or burdensome, then the effectiveness of the regime in promoting
and protecting human rights obviously is cast in doubt.
A.

Accessibility

As mentioned above, unlike state-to-state complaints, petitions by individuals and groups are subject to the threshold problem of accessibility.
States Parties are presumed to have the capacity to avail themselves of
the human rights regime that is their creation; private parties are not. A
variety of factors essentially external to the human rights systems themselves ineluctably condition whether an individual or group can reasonably apply to a human rights regime to claim a human rights violation,
and among these externalities one must certainly include the following:
knowledge of one's human rights; knowledge of the existence of systems
designed to promote and protect human rights; surrounding socioeconomic and political conditions; expectations that the regime actually will
provide redress versus expectations that the application will result only
in retribution by the state; and the availability of counsel in the form of
NGOs, lawyers and others to assist in the drafting and processing of
complaints. This last factor-the availability of counsel-may be at
times the most critical.""'
Taking these conditioning factors into account, it seems evident that,
comparatively speaking, the European human rights regime is the most
accessible of the three regional regimes. First, there is reason to believe
that knowledge of the rights recognized by the European Convention and
of the institutions and procedures designed to guarantee them is relatively widespread. Being the oldest of the three regional regimes, the Eu171. Robert Norris describes the importance of securing counsel in the Inter-American context:
Although it is not necessary to presentation of a case, legal representation may
assist that presentation in several ways. First, the petitioner may be in prison or
subject to harassment and may therefore wish to avoid direct communication with
the Commission by working through a representative whose name or address is
less likely to attract attention. Naming a representative also will provide a permanent address and a reliable means of communication, which lessens the likelihood
of failure to enter a timely plea or rebuttal. In a complicated case or one that
might eventually be referred to the Court, the counsel of an attorney with specialized human rights expertise may prove crucial.
Norris, Individual Petition Procedure,supra note 126, at 122.
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ropean is, logically, a relatively familiar feature of the legal-political
landscape. Operating in a First World setting where socioeconomic and
political conditions favor high literacy rates and general access to the
media, it is likely that knowledge about, and opportunity to know of, the
regime is relatively easily accomplished.17 2 The 34,015 individual applications received by the European Commission between 1973 and 1986173
suggest as much. Indeed, so well known is the regime that one prominent jurist, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Ireland and
Judge of the European Court of Human Rights, has stated that "it
would now be politically impossible in most countries to withdraw from
the Convention, as it has captured the minds of the public to a great
extent.

17 4

Second, bearing in mind the essentially democratic legal and political
arrangements of the Council of Europe's Member States, Western
Europeans can legitimately expect that a valid human rights grievance
brought to the European system will likely result in some form of redress
rather than retribution by the respondent state. In fact, as one keen observer of the European regime, Professor Kevin Boyle, has noted, "The
most frequent reason for the rejection of complaints is that the applicant
state of
has no grounds for invoking international remedies, given the
75
law.""
domestic
under
rights
her
or
his
for
secured
protection
Finally, it seems clear that private counsel in the form of NGOs and
lawyers are important players in the European system. The statistics
alone, with the number of individual applications filed by private counsel
increasing from 4% in 1955 to 45% in 1986,17' appear to prove the
point. Furthermore, to quote Boyle again, "One of the most innovative
and, in practical terms, important features of the European machinery is
the provision for legal aid that has been established for individual

172. This is not to disregard the reality that there exist in Western Europe many
persons who are poor and illiterate or who, for other economic and social reasons, may
lack opportunity to take advantage of the European human rights regime. It is a safe,
though troubling, conclusion that those persons most in need of human rights protection
often are the persons with the least access to the regimes designed to provide it.
173. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES AND STATISTICS 13 (1986) [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES].

174.

Walsh, The European Court of Human Rights, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 271, 284

(1987).
175. Boyle, supra note 48, at 134.
176. EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN
note 173, at 12.

RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES,

supra
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applications."11
In sum, once presented with declarations authorizing it to receive individual petitions, a precondition we already have noted,17 1 the European
regime appears to be not only impressively accessible by private individuals and groups but highly receptive to facilitating their access as well.
All this is very desirable. Private applicants in the European. system, it
seems, have by and large only the requirements of admissibility to overcome to ensure that something will be done about their human rights
1 79

grievances.

Regrettably because of the oftentimes oppressive socioeconomic and
political conditions in the Americas and Africa, one cannot say the same
thing about the Inter-American and African human rights regimes, or at
least not to the same extent. The generally lower levels of literacy and
education, the lesser availability of the media and of opportunities to
exploit the media, and the strained if not altogether terminal economic
conditions in these Third World regions necessarily cause the InterAmerican and African human rights regimes to compare unfavorably to
the European regime vis-a-vis their accessibility by private parties. And,
compounding the problem, the legal systems of certain of the Western
Hemispheric and African countries-sometimes corrupt or ineffectual or
both-frequently inhibit belief that resort to a regional human rights
regime will produce tangible positive results. Indeed, in those countries
that arbitrarily deny the protection of law and that liberally employ mil177. Boyle, supra note 48, at 143. Professor Boyle explains:
The assistance is paid out of the general funds of the Council of Europe and is
governed by an Addendum to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. The
Commission may grant free legal aid in connection with the representation of a
case either at the request of an applicant lodging an application or on its own
initiative.
...Legal aid covers not only fees but traveling and subsistence expenses and
"other necessary out-of-pocket expenses." It normally is available only after the
application has been communicated to the respondent government, and observations are sought from the applicant on the government's response. Thereafter, legal aid will be availableefor preparation of all written pleadings and also for appearances at oral hearings. The fees normally authorized are not generous. They
are determined by reference to the average fees paid for legal aid work within the
Council of Europe, and representation of a poor applicant remains semi-volunteer
work. However, the fact that necessary expenses incurred in preparation of a case
are reimbursed and that travel and subsistence for all appearances at hearings are
paid is extremely important, and it does ensure that a case can be adequately
prepared without the actual outlay of funds by an applicant.
Id. at 143-44.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 231-48.
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itary and paramilitary means to sustain the traditional power structures,
there is not only scarce expectation that a human rights complaint will
be justly redressed but a legitimate fear that it will result in retribution,
not uncommonly of the most severe kind.""0
Of course, our analysis cannot end simply with a description of the
difficulties concerning accessibility because, operationally, the human
rights regimes themselves-most notably the Inter-American regime-make up for these inadequacies to some extent by encouraging
certain modalities and procedures that help to overcome some of the difficulties inhibiting or otherwise complicating individual access. Two
techniques stand out in particular: the on-site study and the granting of
standing to non-victims (i.e., NGOs and other interested parties) to bring
petitions on behalf of victims.
The on-site study 1 ' is important for at least three reasons. First, it is
a means to educate persons about their rights and about their system of
redress-an attribute recognized by, for example, Haiti, when in 1978 it
invited the Inter-American Commission to
take note of the progress made in the country in the area of human rights
and to examine in consultation with Haitian authorities, the most proper
means to consolidate that progress and to stimulate in the home of the
Haitian people a consciousness and knowledge of all the civil and political
rights and in that way to promote permanently the respect and blossoming
of human rights.1 82
Haiti is a poor example, perhaps, it having consistently and brutally
deprived its citizens of their most basic human rights, particularly under

180. As Justice Lihau, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Zaire and
former Professor of Law at Kinshasa University, has noted of many of the African
States:
Obstacles are inherent in the constitutional arrangements and the political systems
of a large number of African States. Fundamentally oriented towards the establishment, the maintenance and the reinforcement of personal dictatorial power, the
character of these national arrangements are as problematic as the Inter-African
system itself, and only serve to facilitate all sorts of human rights violations. The
attitude of the African masses-resignation in the face of the abuse of power, a
heritage of the colonial and even the pre-colonial epochs-scarcely encourages
them to firmly demand respect for their rights.

Lihau, supra note 128, at 14.
181. For a concise description of the on-site study or investigation techniques, see
Norris, Observations In Loco: Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 15 TEx. INT'L L.J. 46, 76-89 (1980).
182. Id. at 73 (quoting letter from the Government of Haiti to the IACHR (January
26, 1978) (document on file at the IACHR office in Washington, D.C.)).
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the Duvalier regimes. But as Robert Norris points out, "Although the
respective governments may fail to make changes, at least the citizens
with whom the Commission came into contact will have learned of its
existence. Some will now be aware that international human rights standards exist, as well as international institutions to whom [sic] they can
complain." 1 8 3
Second, the on-site study may significantly facilitate the submission of
petitions. The Inter-American Commission, for example, received more
than 4,000 individual petitions during its visit to Argentina in 1979, and
in 1980 it received approximately 3,000 such petitions while in Nicaragua, T8 in each case a marked increase from the number of petitions it
ordinarily received.
Finally, the on-site study may influence attitudes toward the redress of
human rights grievances. Professor Tom Farer, former President of the
Inter-American Commission, has explained the importance of what he
calls "exposure": 15
Exposure, or the threat thereof, has accomplished a mitigation of barbarity in many identifiable instances throughout the Western Hemisphere. It
cannot be doubted that the prospect or consequences of a Commission inquiry has saved lives, averted torture, terminated arbitrary detentions, and
ameliorated conditions of detention. Compared to the totality of human
rights violations in the Hemisphere, the scope of the Commission's direct
impact on the conditions of life has been modest. But it has not been trivial. And the Commission's indirect impact may have been greater.186
Such effect certainly must give individuals more confidence in the redressive possibilities of the human rights regime and, consequently, must encourage applications.
Of course, one must realize that the three regimes vary dramatically in
their authority to conduct on-site studies and in their experience in exercising that authority as well, facts that necessarily condition their success
in mitigating the difficulties of individual access. The Inter-American
183. Norris, ObservationsIn Loco, supra note 181, at 74.
184. T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D. SHELTON, supra note 77, at 261.
185. Farer, The OAS at the Crossroads:Human Rights, 72 IOWA L. REV. 401, 403
(1987) [hereinafter Farer, OAS at the Crossroads].
186. Id. In a unique instance, not since repeated, the Inter-American Commission's
on-site study of claimed human rights violations by the Somoza Government in Nicaragua led to a resolution by the OAS Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs for the immediate and definitive replacement of the Somoza Government. See
Resolution II, approved June 23, 1979 at the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OEA/ser. F/II, doc. 40/79 rev.2 (original in Spanish). For
related discussion, see infra note 277 and accompanying text.
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Commission-with its jurisdiction extending not only to the States Parties to the American Convention but, drawing on the American Declaration as its normative instrument,1 7 also to the Member States of the
OAS regardless of their official posture toward the Convention 88-has
the broadest authority 89 and, as it happens, experience.19 Because onsite studies are not as necessary in the European socioeconomic and political context and among countries where human rights deprivations
tend to be individual-specific rather than directed against large numbers
of people over long periods of time,"'1 the European Commission has
both narrower authority192 and narrower experience. 19 3 The African

187. See supra note 20.
188. See Buergenthal, View from the Inter-American Court, supra note 96, at 306.
189. Robert Norris asserts that the Inter-American Commission's authority to conduct on-site studies under the American Convention is much broader than it was prior to
the Convention:
[T]he authority of the Commission to carry out an on-site observation, which has
previously been based primarily upon accepted practice, has been considerably
strengthened and institutionalized under the new system. The new statute makes
specific provision for the sending of fact-finding missions to the territory of any
member state of the OAS, albeit with the consent or at the invitation of the government concerned. It is significant that neither the purpose nor the scope of such
a mission is limited by the statute. With respect to states parties, the American
Convention has taken a giant step forward by eliminating the traditional request
for consent, with the exception of the special procedure for the investigation of
serious and urgent cases under article 48(2). The Commission need only inform
the government of its decision to undertake an observation in loco and request the
necessary facilities. Should a state party which has accepted the jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights refuse to provide those facilities, the
Commission could submit the matter to the Court under article 62(1) for a finding
of whether the government is in violation of the American Convention.
Norris, Observations In Loco, supra note 181, at 94-95. Farer, on the other hand,
writes, "I do not think that the Convention had any operational effect on the Commission's ability or even its authority to conduct on-site studies." Letter from Professor Tom
J. Farer to Burns H. Weston (Sept. 4, 1987) (discussing early draft of this essay).
190. The Commission has interpreted its authority liberally and has created a myriad of ways to enter a country to conduct an on-site study. See generally Norris, Observations In Loco, supra note 181. See also supra note 189.
191. Boyle, supra note 48, at 134. "[O]nly rarely does the [European] Commission
face complaints of human rights violations on the scale or of the kind that are too well
known elsewhere in the world." Id.
192. [T]he European Commission has no jurisdiction under the European Convention on Human Rights generally to investigate human rights situations in any
of the High Contracting States Parties to the Convention. It rather examines in
quasi-judicial proceedings complaints concerning breaches of the Convention
brought before it either by a High Contracting Party under Art. 24 or by an
individual, a group of individuals or a non-governmental organisation, claiming to
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Commission, while granted significant enumerated and broad investigatory powers,1 94 which is desirable, is still too short-lived to show any onsite study experience. All in all, however, the on-site study is a valuable
tool in expanding individual and group accessibility to the regional
human rights regimes.
As for the granting of standing to non-victims to bring petitions on
behalf of victims, which allows NGOs and others not affected by the
barriers to accessibility to become advocates on behalf of those who cannot reasonably gain access to the regime, much good can be said. Noting
the importance of NGOs in the context of the African regime, the former
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Zaire-Justice Lihau-writes:
It is essential that [private individuals and organizations] act without fail
to send the Commission petitions and communications bluntly denouncing
all those human rights violations in African countries that come to their
attention-whether they are themselves victims of the violations or have
seen, or been informed about others whose rights have been abused. If
they take prompt action to alert the Commission to human rights violations as they occur, and if they act in concert to document these violations
for the Commission and if at the same time they take steps to inform the
public, there is no doubt but that they can in the long run contribute
greatly towards changing the African human rights situation for the
better.195

be the victim of a violation of the Convention, under Art. 25. Moreover, the question of an on-the-spot visit arises in principle only in such cases which have been
declared admissible, that is to say, which have been accepted for an examination of
the merits. . . . It is therefore not surprising that there have been only few occasions for on-site observations by the Commission.
Kruger, The Experience of the European Commission on Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 151, 151 (B.
Ramcharan ed. 1982).
193. The European Commission has exercised its limited authority to conduct on-site
studies in a very restricted manner, generally in cases concerning the alleged ill-treatment
of detainees or prisoners. See id. at 158.
194. See, e.g., African Charter, supra note 7, art. 46. "The Commission may resort

to any appropriate method of investigation." Id.
195. Lihau, supra note 128, at 14-15. Gittleman also sees an educational role to be
played by NGOs in the African context:
Given the meager public resources currently available for such educational or promotional efforts, NGOs can assist in ameliorating the situation by contributing
manpower and resources in any of the areas within the commission's promotional
mandate.
• ..Perhaps the greatest need at this stage is for better dissemination of information to the people regarding their rights. The All-African Conference of
Churches, for example has stated that "due to the high rate of illiteracy, people
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Richard Gittleman adds: "The challenge of the African Commission and
interested NGOs and governments will be to build the institutions required to enforce human rights while concurrently disseminating infor1 96
mation to the grass-roots level of society."
The African and Inter-American regimes authorize application by
non-victims most liberally, allowing applications by nearly anyone as
long as the applications meet the tests of admissibility.1 97 In contrast, as
noted earlier, the European regime allows only victims or those with
direct knowledge of a violation to make applications to the European
Commission,19 not the most optimal state of affairs whatever the
explanation.
In sum, Western Europe appears to present the fewest problems of
accessibility among the three regional human rights systems, and it is
perhaps for this reason that the European Convention grants limited authority for on-site studies and disallows surrogate applications by nonvictims. The Americas and Africa, on the other hand, as a consequence
of their Third World conditions, clearly present serious accessibility
problems, and seemingly this fact explains the Inter-American and African regimes' broad grant of authority for on-site studies and their liberal
treatment of non-victim applications. The threshold problem of accessibility thus revealed consequently serves as a basis not only for understanding but also for considering how the Member States might
strengthen each of the regimes.
B.

Admissibility

Once a state, individual, group or NGO presents an application or
petition to a regional commission, the issue arises whether or not the
application or petition is "admissible"-that is, whether the commission
to which it is brought is authorized to accept it. Reference to three considerations resolves this issue: first, whether the commission has jurisdiction over the parties; second, whether the application or complaint pertains to a right that the governing instrument expressly enumerates; and

are unaware of their rights, and when they are aware of them, they see them as a
favor from a politician."
Gittleman, Prospects and Procedures,supra note 128, at 154 (quoting All African Conference of Churches, Due Process and the Rule of Law, STRUCTURES OF INJUSTICE 10
(1975), cited in COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, REGIONAL
PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 21 (1980)).
196. Id. at 155.
197. See infra text accompanying note 204.
198. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 25(1).
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third, whether the parties have proceeded according to the rules that the
governing instrument prescribes.
1. Party Jurisdiction
That the European, Inter-American, and African Commissions are
limited in their jurisdiction over states and private parties bears repeating.19 9 The European Commission may entertain state-to-state complaints simply on the condition that the petitioner and respondent states
are party to the European Convention,20 " but it may entertain individual
petitions only if the respondent state "has declared that it recognizes the
competence of the Commission to receive such petitions."' 2 0 ' Conversely,

as an organ of the American Convention, the Inter-American Commission has automatic jurisdiction over individual applications, a0 2 but jurisdiction over state-to-state complaints exists only if the respondent state
has formally recognized "the competence of the Commission to receive
and examine communications in which a State Party alleges that another
State Party has committed a violation of a human right set forth in this
Convention." 203 Finally, the African Commission, granted perhaps the
broadest jurisdiction among the three regional commissions, has authority to entertain both state-to-state complaints and private petitions automatically, subject almost alone to the requirement that the concerned
states be party to the African Charter, 20 4 an arrangement that certainly
improves on the European and Inter-American systems, whose jurisdiction of their commissions (and courts) could well stand expansion to the
fullest possible extent, especially in respect of private individuals, groups
and NGOs. On the other hand, the African regime is not without its
own shortcomings. Regrettably, the African Commission may examine
communications from private individuals and non-governmental institutions and groups only if the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government so requests and only if a majority of the Commission so decides,20 5 a condition that some informed observers have justifiably
199. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44, 119-21, and 160-62.
200. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 24.
201. Id. art. 25(1).
202. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 44.
203. Id. art. 45. As an organ of the OAS drawing on the 1948 American Declaration, supra note 20, for its normative guidance, however, the Inter-American Commission has jurisdiction over OAS Member States even if they have not ratified the American Convention. For related discussion, see supra text accompanying note 195.
204. African Charter, supra note 7, arts. 47-48, 55-56.
205. Id. arts. 55(2), 58. For related discussion, see supra text accompanying notes
158-62.
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criticized. To quote Justice Lihau once again:
It is unfortunate that the Commission's proceedings are so heavily dependent upon the Heads of State. When it comes to the Commission's mandate, what can it actually do? It is unlikely that the Commission will be
permitted to take the initiative in presenting documented charges to the
Conference of Heads of State and Government, except perhaps in those
instances where it is in the interests of governments to permit the Commission to do so.2"'
Yet how effective the African regime will be in dealing with specific
applications remains to be seen.
2.

Enumerated Rights

The second general admissibility requirement-that the inter-state
complaint and individual petition allege violation of a right that the governing instrument protects-is on its face unobjectionable. At least two
considerations merit attention, however, each of which offers insight into
the extent to which, relatively at least, the three regional regimes are
effective in safeguarding the rights they are designed to promote and
protect.
First, as we have seen, the three regional regimes differ in the breadth
and depth of rights they recognize201 sometimes markedly-and, of
course, the narrower the breadth or the shallower the depth of rights
protected the less effective the human rights regime is likely to be in
safeguarding human dignity overall. For example, choosing to treat certain "second generation" rights under the reportorial regime of the European Social Charter rather than the adjudicative protections of the European Convention 2 8-e.g., "the right of the worker to earn his living in
an occupation freely entered upon";20 9 "the right of men and women
workers to equal pay for work of equal value";21 0 or "the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interest,
including the right to strike. . ."; 2 1 -the Council of Europe may have

206. Lihau, supra note 128, at 14.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36, 67-69, 84-87, and 131-43.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69. Like the European regime, the InterAmerican regime provides for reportorial procedures to safeguard economic, social and
cultural rights. Under the African Charter, however, an individual, group or NGO arguably could bring an application for violations of "first," "second" or even "third generation" rights. Id.
209. European Social Charter, supra note 5, art. 1(2).
210. Id. art. 4(3).
211. Id. art. 6(4).
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caused the protection of these rights to be less effective than they might
otherwise have been.21 2 Similarly, within the framework of a single category of rights exclusively (e.g., "first generation" rights), one may pause
at the following differences: (1) that the European Convention recognizes
the right to be free from debtor prison2" 3 but the American Convention
and African Charter do not; (2) that the American Convention recognizes the right to juridical personality, 21 4 to reply, 215 to a name 2 6 and to
a nationality 7 but the European Convention and the African Charter
do not; or (3) that the European and American Conventions recognize
the right to privacy2"" and to legal protection 21 9 but the African Charter
does not. Of course, one also must acknowledge that the regional human
rights regimes will be more or less effective in safeguarding human dignity depending on the way they define the rights they actually recognize
in common. Like the European and American Conventions, for example,
the African Charter recognizes the right to a fair trial.22 ° Unlike its European and American counterparts, however, it does not guarantee that
the proceedings shall be public.

212. One could say the same about certain economic, social and cultural rights in
relation to the American Convention in the Inter-American system, which similarly
places "second generation" rights in a legal regime more or less separate from "first
generation" rights. See supra note 87 and accompanying text, including the observation
that the OAS currently is considering a draft treaty dealing with economic, social and
cultural rights.
One should note, however, that increasingly there have been pleas for the inclusion of
certain economic, social and cultural rights in the European Convention. See, e.g., Berenstein, Economic and Social Rights: Their Inclusion in the European Convention on
Human Rights-Problems of Formulation and Interpretation, 2 HUM. RTS. L.J. 257
(1981). Important pleas have come also from the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. See, e.g., ParliamentaryAssembly Recommendation 838 (Sept. 27, 1978), 26 EUR. Y.B. 391 (1978), advancing the need to examine what basic economic, social, and cultural rights could be incorporated in the
Convention without weakening the credibility of the existing system. For critical comment, on the other hand, see, e.g., P. VAN DUK & G. VAN HOOF, supra note 27, at 47477.
213. Protocol II, supra note 4, art. 1.
214. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 3.
215. Id. art. 14.
216. Id. art. 18.
217. Id. art. 20.
218. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 8; American Convention, supra note
6, art. 11.
219. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 13; American Convention, supra note
6, art. 25.
220. African Charter, supra note 7, art. 7(1).
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Second, because clauses in the governing instruments allow the regimes to derogate from expressly enumerated rights (and in a potentially
abusive manner if they interpret the clauses liberally), the three regional
regimes are at some liberty to curtail even rights they formally recognize.
For example, the European Convention provides in general that
[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its
obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.2"'
In addition, the European Convention contains several limiting or
"clawback" clauses 222 permitting deviation from specific enumerated
rights-in effect defining the specific rights more narrowly than might
otherwise have been done. For example, article 8(1), which states that
"[elveryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence," is qualified by article 8(2), which provides that
[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the
22 3
rights and freedoms of others.

The American Convention contains a similar, perhaps somewhat narrower general derogation clause-i.e., adding that any "suspension" of
enumerated rights "[may] not involve discrimination on the ground of
race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin" 22 4-and likewise
221. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 15(1).
222. The term is drawn from Higgins, DerogationsUnder Human Rights Treaties,
48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 281 (1976-1977). It means "one that permits, in normal circumstances, breach of an obligation for a specified number of public reasons." Id. at 281. It
thus differs from a derogation clause "which allow[s] suspension or breach of certain

obligations in circumstances of war or public emergency." Id.
223. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 8(2). For other similar built-in derogation clauses in the European Convention, see id. art. 9(2), qualifying the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion set forth in art. 9(1); art. 10(2), qualifying the
right to freedom of expression set forth in art. 10(1); and art. 11(2), qualifying the right

to freedom of assembly and association set forth in art. 11(1). See also id. art. 6(1),
recognizing the right to public criminal proceedings but permitting the exclusion of the
press and public from all or part of a trial "in the interests of morals, public order or
national security in a democratic society" as well as in other circumstances.
224. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 27(1).
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contains several "clawback" clauses of the sort just quoted.22 5 And as for
the African Charter, which contains no general derogation clause but
does include two "clawback" clauses22 6 and several restrictive definitions
of rights,2 2 it does provide for a functional equivalent in the form of a
detailed series of duties or "obligations of solidarity"-to the family, society, the state and the international African community-which the individual is expected to honor and which, obviously, a state can construe
to limit the rights recognized in the Charter.2 28 Indeed, where the European and American Conventions contain language absolutely prohibiting
derogations from certain of their enumerated rights,2 2 and where both

225. See, e.g., id. art. 8(5), restricting public criminal proceedings "insofar as may be
necessary to protect the interests of justice" and art. 12(3), subjecting the freedom to
manifest one's religion and beliefs "to the limitations prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights or freedoms of
others." See also id. arts. 15, 16(2), and 22(3), similarly qualifying the right of assembly,
the right to freedom of association and the right to freedom of movement and residence,
respectively.
226. See African Charter, supra note 7, art. 11, permitting "restrictions" on the
right to assembly "in the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights
and freedoms of others"; and id. art. 12(2), permitting "restrictions" on the right to
freedom of movement "for the protection of national security, law and order, public
health or morality."
227. See, e.g., id. art. 6, which reads, "Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his freedom except for

reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained." (Emphasis added). See also id. arts. 4, 8, 9(2), 10(1) & (2),
and 12(1).
Richard Gittleman writes critically of such provisions:
The substantive provisions of the African Charter contain "clawback" clauses that
permit a state to restrict rights to the extent permitted by domestic law. Such
extremely vague standards appear to place no external restraints upon government
actions, although that is arguably the purpose of human rights instruments. Article
6, the right to liberty, provides an example. . . . The Charter does not define or
limit [the] "reasons and conditions previously laid down by law" or similar
phrases such as "within the law" (article 9) or "provided that he abides by the
law" (article 10).
Gittleman, Prospects and Procedures, supra note 128, at 158.
228. African Charter, supra note 7, arts. 27-29. In particular, note id. art. 27(2),
providing that "[tihe rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due
regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest"; id. art.
29(3), stipulating that the individual shall have the duty "[n]ot to compromise the security of the state whose national or resident he is"; and id. art. 29(4), requiring the individual "[t]o preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity, particularly when the
latter is threatened." For related discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 135-43.
229. See European Convention, supra note 4, art. 15(2), prohibiting "derogation"
absolutely from the right to life (except from lawful acts of war), the right to be free
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also require notice to the Secretaries General of the Council of Europe
and the OAS, respectively, in the event of the exercise of the state right
of derogation or suspension, 3 0 the African Charter provides for none of
these safeguards. It is a condition that merits great criticism.
3.

Rules of Procedure

Except for the general requirement that communications be in writing
and addressed to the appropriate offices, 2 31 only the Inter-American regime indicates any particular procedural preconditions for the lodging of
inter-state complaints before its human rights commission.2 2 The majority of these are identical to the procedural rules established for individual
petitions, discussed below,2 33 and on their face they seem unobjectionable. However, the American Convention's additional and previously
noted proviso that inter-state complaints be inadmissible until the respondent state has formally recognized the competence of the InterAmerican Commission

34

is regrettable, even if explicable.2

35

It is just

one more instance of the old Adam of state sovereignty serving to retard
the effective protection of recognized human rights.
The general picture is a bit more complicated when it comes to inter-

from torture and other forms of cruel treatment, the right to be free from slavery and the
right not to be tried under ex post facto laws. See also American Convention, supra note
6, art. 27(2), absolutely prohibiting "suspension" of all the non-derogable rights of the
European Convention plus the right to juridical personality, the right to freedom of conscience and religion, the rights of the family, the right to a name, the rights of the child,
the right to nationality, the right to participate in government, and, one should note, "the
judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights." On this last point, see the
Inter-American Court's Consultative Opinion OC-8/87, adopted at the 16th Regular
Session of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on Jan. 30, 1987.
230. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 15(3); American Convention, supra
note 6, art. 27(3).
231. Except in the case of inter-state complaints lodged with the African Commission, these requirements are more implicit than explicit. See European Convention,
supra note 4, art. 24; American Convention, supra note 6, art. 45; African Charter,
supra note 7, art. 47.
232. According to article 47 of the African Charter, as previously observed, see supra
text accompanying note 164, the complaining and respondent States Party to the Charter
are encouraged to achieve a friendly settlement if at all possible before resorting to the
good offices of the African Commission. African Charter, supra note 7, art. 47. However, according to African Charter article 49, this stipulation is optional, hortatory rather
than mandatory. Id. art. 49.
233. See infra text accompanying notes 238-48.
234. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 45(2). See supra text accompanying
note 119 for related comment.
235. See Judge Buergenthal's observations, supra note 121.
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state complaints before the European and Inter-American courts. First,
States Parties to the conventions must have formally accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the courts;2 - and second, they must have at least
attempted a friendly settlement.2"' The compulsory jurisdiction requirement, though doubtless inescapable, is regrettable, and for the same reasons that one may rue the American Convention's optional inter-state
complaint procedure. The friendly settlement requirement, on the other
hand, seems unobjectionable-except, that is, for the possibility that
States Parties might use it as a delaying tactic against the swift adjudication of otherwise admissible human rights complaints.
More elaborate rules of procedure condition the lodging of individual
and other private petitions under the three regional regimes. In all three
instances, before the respective commissions may assume jurisdiction the
parties must have exhausted all domestic remedies.2 3 Also, the petition
must have been filed within six months or a reasonable time thereafter, 23 9 must set forth at least the name of the petitioner (no anonymous
petitions are allowed) 24 0 and must not have been submitted to another
international tribunal or proceeding. 241 Under the European Convention,
in addition, the petition must be from an individual, group of individuals
or NGO claiming to be a victim of a violation 242 (as previously noted)243

236. European Convention, supra note 4, arts. 46, 48; American Convention, supra
note 6, art. 62.
237. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 47; American Convention, supra note
6, arts. 48-50.
238. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 26; American Convention, supra note
6, art. 46(I)(a); African Charter, supra note 7, art. 56(5). It is a general principle of
international law, however, and one to which all three human rights regimes are committed, that fruitless attempts at the exhaustion of domestic remedies is not required. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 46(2) is explicit and detailed in this regard. Thus, in
a country providing only nominal remedies such exhaustion would not be required. See
generally Trinidad, Domestic Jurisdictionand Exhaustion of Local Remedies: A Comparative Analysis, 16 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 187 (1976).
239. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 26 ("six months from the date on
which the final decision was taken"); American Convention, supra note 6, art. 46(1)(b)
("six months from the date on which the party alleging violation of his rights was notified of the final judgment"); African Charter, supra note 7, art. 56(6) ("within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are exhausted or from the date the Commission
is seized of the matter").
240. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 27(1)(a); American Convention, supra
note 6, art. 46(1)(d); African Charter, supra note 7, art. 56(1).
241. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 27(b); American Convention, supra
note 6, art. 46(1)(c), 47(d); African Charter, supra note 7, art. 56(7).
242. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 25(1).
243. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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and must not be "incompatible with the provisions of the . . .Conven'244
tion manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of petition."
Under the American Convention, the only additional explicit requirements are that the petition state facts "that tend to establish a violation
of the rights guaranteed by [the) Convention" 245 and that it not be
"manifestly groundless or obviously out of order. '246 Under the African
Charter, similarly, the only additional explicit requirements are that the
petition be "compatible with the Charter of the [OAU] or with the present Charter" 24' and that it be "not written in disparaging or insulting
language directed against the state concerned and its institutions or to the
'248
[OAU].
Assuming the conscientious and honorable administration of the regional regimes, these rules of procedure would not seem to impede the
effective handling of legitimate human rights grievances for the most
part, although clearly the generality-indeed vagueness-of such preconditional terminology as "an abuse of the right of petition," "manifestly
groundless or obviously out of order," and "disparaging or insulting language" is subject to potentially devious manipulation. The European
Convention's requirement that only victims of violations may lodge petitions before the European Commission is, on the other hand, most unfortunate. It ignores the fact that, in the struggle for human dignity against
the abuses of state power especially, ours truly is a Kafkaesque world.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Once the three regional regimes declare a human rights grievance admissible, the initial procedures followed are quite similar, particularly
244. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 27(2). Boyle explains the European
Convention procedure from this point on:
Once the decision to communicate an application is made by the Commission, the
respondent government is normally given eight weeks within which to submit its
observations. The Commission forwards a copy of the government's observations to
the applicant, who is then invited to submit observations in reply. The focus of
observations from both parties at this stage will include both issues of fact (unless
they are disputed) and admissibility issues under articles 26 and 27 of the Convention. Once the exchange of observations is concluded, a new report on admissibility
is prepared by the rapporteur and discussed by the full Commission. If the application is not rejected at this point, the Commission may either immediately declare
the application admissible or schedule oral hearings on admissibility.
Boyle, supra note 48, at 145-46.
245. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 47(b).
246. Id. art. 47(c).
247. African Charter, supra note 7, art. 56(2).
248. Id. art. 56(3).
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insofar as individual and other private petitions are concerned.24 9 Each
commission conducts fact-finding and attempts to achieve a friendly settlement.2 5 If the attempts at friendly settlement are successful, each
commission then prepares a report stating the facts and its findings for
submission to the states concerned and to the regional organs designated
by each governing instrument-to the Committee of Ministers and the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe in the case of the European
regime,2 51 to the OAS Secretary General in the case of the Inter-American regime2 52 and to the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in the case of the African regime.25 3 If the commissions are unable
to reach a friendly settlement, then, in the case of the European regime,
the commission prepares and submits a similar report to the concerned
states and the Committee of Ministers, with the right to make such
"proposals" as the European Commission sees fit.254 In the case of the
Inter-American regime, the Commission submits a similar report to the
concerned states only, with the right to make such "proposals and recommendations" as the Inter-American Commission sees fit.255 And in the
case of the African regime, the Commission submits a similar report
again to the states concerned and to the OAU Assembly of Heads of
State and Government, but this time with the right to make such "recommendations" as the African Commission deems useful.2 56 Additionally, under the European and Inter-American regimes, but not under the
African regime (for lack of an appropriate tribunal),257 the states concerned and the respective commissions may refer a case to their respective regional courts for final adjudication and disposition.2 5 Under the
European system, alternatively, the Committee of Ministers may con2 59
sider and decide the case.

249.

For a detailed chart tracing the procedure upon the filing of an application with

the European Commission, see Boyle, supra note 48, at 137.

250. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 28; American Convention, supra note
6, art. 48; African Charter, supra note 7, art. 52.
251. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 30.
252. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 49.
253. African Charter, supra note 7, art. 52.
254. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 31.
255. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 50.
256. African Charter, supra note 7, arts. 52-53.
257. For pertinent discussion, see supra text accompanying note 165.
258. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 48; American Convention, supra note
6, art. 61. Under the African Charter, supra note 7, arts. 53, 58-59, the OAU Assembly
of Heads of State and Government performs this dispositional function. See supra text
accompanying note 164.
259. Christina Cerna notes that under the Inter-American regime a somewhat simi-
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It is not the purpose of this Article to appraise each regional regime's
efficiency in dealing with these grievance procedures-in processing the
applications and in implementing the decisions reached relative to them.
Of course, a thorough empirical study along these lines is very much in
order. If bureaucratic or other inefficiency significantly marks the process
of handling inter-state complaints and private petitions, then certainly
the effectiveness of the human rights regime in handling human rights
grievances will be open to serious question. But in exploring these issues
we are limited by the infancy of the African regime and by the relative
inexperience of the Inter-American regime under the American Convention; also, in general, by a dearth of readily available probative data.260

lar process to the referral to the Committee of Ministers is available:
IT]he annual and special reports are the documentation the Commission submits
to the General Assembly for whatever political decision it deems appropriate. In
the past, our reports have also gone to other political bodies such as the Meeting of
Consultation of Foreign Ministers, a type of Security Council, which meets to
discuss political issues of extreme urgency ...
For example, in the case of Nicaragua in 1978, the government of Venezuela
convoked a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers to consider the threat to
peace in the Central-American region caused by the Nicaraguan civil war. This
Meeting of Consultation requested that our Commission accelerate the plan for a
visit to Nicaragua and report back to them on the human rights situation, which
the Commission did. In June of 1979, just a month before Somoza departed, the
Meeting of Consultation made a historic decision based, inter alia, on the Commission's human rights report, and passed a resolution calling for a political solution to that conflict-an immediate and definitive replacement of the Somoza government. This decision is historic if you compare decisions of other international
organizations in which the maximum sanction ever applied to a delinquent state
has been condemnation or expulsion from the system. . . . This is a unique case,
however, not since repeated, and the product of an abundance of political, as well
as legal, factors.
Cerna, supra note 121, at 314-15. For related discussion, see supra note 186 and accompanying text.
260. Farer writes of the difficulty of evaluating the impact of the Inter-American
Commission's work:
Governments . . . do not admit delinquencies. If individuals are freed, their liberation, if it is advertised at all, is presented as an act of official grace. It . . . is
difficult to measure achievement outside the paper world of reports and communications because the commission has no absolute right of access to the prisons, detention camps, and interrogation centers where hope is crushed and identity extinguished. Without the permission of governments, the commission remains at a vast
distance from the ultimate subject of its concern: individual human beings. Being
unable to communicate directly with them or, frequently, with their wives, children, friends, and others intimately familiar with the facts, it can reach a firm and
final conclusion in particular cases (the kind of conclusion to which governments
would feel a considerable compulsion to respond directly) only in a limited number
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Still, by way of conclusion, some general statistical data drawn from
the experience of the oldest of the regional human rights regimes-the
European-may prove insightful even though it lacks clarity in a number of respects.2"' Of the 34,015 private petitions filed with the European Commission during the period 1973 to 1986 (supplementing 18
inter-state complaints filed with the Commission during the same pe23
riod), 2 2 the Commission registered only 12,327 (or about one-third)
and declared only 492 of these to be admissible. 26 4 Later rejecting eight
on the merits, 265 the Commission reported to the Committee of Ministers
in 310 of these 492 cases. 68 In addition, as of January 1, 1986, the
European Court had heard 109 cases,2 7 one of them an inter-state
288
case.
On the basis of this data,26 9 one surely can say that the European
regime has been genuinely receptive to processing human rights grievances, both private and inter-state-so receptive, indeed, that it now suffers in effectiveness from an "unprecedented" backlog of cases such that
"the time presently needed. . . to examine an [individual] application as
to its admissibility and merits is often more than five years. 27 0° In addition, however, it seems fair to conclude that the European regime has
been either extraordinarily diligent in winnowing out defective claims or,
mindful of its statist origins, unduly conservative in defining valid ones.

of instances, usually where governments tacitly concede the charges.
T. FARER, GRAND STRATEGY, supra note 104, at 173-74.
261. For further reference, see, e.g., P. VAN DIJK & G. VAN HOOF,supra note 27,
at 455-460.
262. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES,
supra note 173, at 13 and accompanying text.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
STOCK-TAKING ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 138 (Supp.
1985). Unofficial communications from several colleagues indicate that, as of January 1,
1987, the European Court had heard 14 additional cases for a total of 123 cases.
268. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23-I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1976).
269. For a conclusory evaluation of such data, see Treschel, Towards the Merger of
the Supervisory Organs:Seeking A Way Out of the Deadlock, 8 HUM. RTS. L.J. 11, 1317 (1987).
270. EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES, supra
note 173, at 2. In the face of this situation, brought about in part by a failure to secure
"an adequate increase of staff in the budget for 1987," the European Commission was
forced to cancel two of the four additional week-long sessions it had hoped to add in 1987
to its normal five two-week sessions to address the backlog problem. Id.
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Possibly it has been both. In any event, bearing in mind that statist imperatives often tend to outweigh the values of human dignity even in
modern-day Europe, 492 admissible claims out of 34,015 filed and
12,327 registered over a thirteen-year period (or about 1% and 4% respectively) seems not an impressive record from a progressive point of
view. On the other hand, informed commentators have said that the European regime has significantly affected the promotion and protection of
human rights in the European context-by upholding the rights of individuals,2 ' by influencing States Parties2 72 and by providing a model
upon which the other two regional systems could draw.2 3
Likewise, one may congratulate the Inter-American regime for its efforts to promote and protect rights. While its statistical data is difficult to
secure,27 4 informed observers conclude that it has been by and large suc-

271. For an overview of recent cases in which the European Court has upheld the
rights of individuals, see Walsh, supra note 174, at 277-83. See generally P. VAN DIjK
& G. VAN HOOF, supra note 27, at 181-376.
272. Van Dijk and van Hoof provide these examples:
Austria had amended its legislation in respect of the right of appeal in criminal
cases, issued new directives concerning the treatment of sick and wounded prisoners on public hospitals, and introduced a new system of free legal aid. Belgium has
proceeded to amend its criminal legislation, its vagrancy legislation, and its legislation on the use of languages in schools. The Federal Republic of Germany has
introduced a new regulation concerning detention pending judicial proceedings.
The United Kingdom has provided for a right of action in immigration cases, and
there the practice of caning as a penalty is in process of being abolished. Sweden
has taken measures to allow certain exceptions to obligatory religious education.
Norway has amended its Constitution to guarantee full religious liberty. Switzerland has carried through constitutional reforms in order to extend the suffrage to
women and to abolish certain restrictions for Jesuits. The Netherlands, finally,
revised its military disciplinary law and introduced modifications in the application of the Act on the Insane ...
P. VAN DUK & G. VAN HOOF, supra note 27, at 458-59.
273. As Judge Buergenthal has observed, the Inter-American and European courts
"have engaged in regular exchanges since the establishment of [the Inter-American
Court]." Buergenthal, Viewfrom the Inter-American Court, supra note 96, at 304. "The
accomplishments of the European system are great," he explains, "and it remains a
model for all of us." Id. at 305.
274. But see T. FARER, GRAND STRATEGY, supra note 104, at 171, who reports
that "the number of individual cases considered by the [Inter-American] commission,"
paralleling the experience of the European Commission, "has grown at an exponential
rate in recent years." Farer continues:
In 1968, the Commission opened fourteen new cases and had approximately eighteen pending. Five years later, those figures had changed only modestly: in 1973,
approximately twenty-six cases were opened while twenty-four were pending. By
1976, however, the corresponding figures were 139 and 145. In 1980, the number
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cessful in pressing states to protect individual rights2 5 and in influencing
countries to change patterns of abuses.2"' Former President of the InterAmerican Commission Tom Farer explains the Commission's subtle yet
important influence in Argentina:
In the Argentine case the Commission's very presence seemed to have
opened doors and windows hitherto closed primarily to the Argentine people themselves. The press suddenly discovered the problem of the disappeared. A few judges began, albeit very cautiously, to probe behind official
assurances and to question the
comprehensiveness and intensity of restric77
tions on personal freedom.

One must note, however, that Farer is speaking of the Commission in its
capacity as an organ of the OAS as opposed to the American Convention. And on this critical distinction, former President of the Inter-American Court, Judge Buergenthal, writing in 1987, had the following to
say:
The entry into force of the American Convention has permitted the existence side-by-side of the juridically more formal Convention system with
that of the more flexible [OAS] Charter-based system, giving the Commission and Court many more institutional tools for dealing with human
rights violations than are available in other human rights systems. The
individual petition machinery of the inter-American system has been a
complete failure. Individual cases appear to get lost in a system that is
geared to large-scale violations. In part that is due to the fact that the
Commission treats individual petitions under the Convention in much the
same way as those that come in under the Declaration. By blurring the
juridical differences that exist between these two types of petitions, the
Commission has failed to take advantage of the greater powers it has
under the Convention to dispose of complaints.2 8
Buergenthal added: "The petition system consequently still operates as it
did before the Convention entered into force, which may explain, but
certainly not excuse, the fact that no contentious case has as yet been
referred to the Court by the Commission. 27 9

of cases reached 2,900, while there were approximately 4,730 cases in process.
Id.
275. See generally Buergenthal, View from the Inter-American Court, note 96;
Cerna, supra note 121. See also T. FARER, GRAND STRATEGY, supra note 104, at 174.
276. See, e.g., Norris, ObservationsIn Loco, supra note 181, at 56-59, for a description of the Inter-American Commission's activities in the Dominican Republic.
277. Farer, OAS at the Crossroads, supra note 185, at 402.
278. Buergenthal, Implementation, supra note 83, at 75.
279. Id. As of this writing three contentious cases are before the Inter-American
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Thus, the regional human rights regimes, including the African regime which has only recently come into operation, undergo a continuous
process of criticism and refinement, appraisal and recommendation.
Many commentators have suggested normative, institutional and procedural adjustments necessary to make the three regional regimes more
effective 2 8 -for example: in the case of the European regime, placing
individual petitions on the same mandatory footing as inter-state complaints, permitting access to non-victims representatives as well as to victims and merging the European Commission and Court; in the case of
the Inter-American regime, placing inter-state complaints on the same
mandatory footing as individual petitions and exploiting the full authority of the Inter-American Commission under the American Convention;
in the case of the African regime, creating a court, narrowing the derogation clauses of the African Charter and de-politicizing the activities of
the African Commission; in the case of both the European and InterAmerican regimes, raising the standing of individuals at the court level,
expending more energy to urge Member States to accept the full extent
of the jurisdiction of the commissions and the courts, and narrowing the
interpretation of the derogation clauses in both of the conventions; and in
the case of all three regimes, raising the requirements for the promotion
and protection of economic, social and cultural rights.
Hopefully the international legal community will act on these recom-

Court.
280.

Regarding the European human rights regime, see generally A. ROBERTSON,
VAN DUK & G. VAN HOFF, supra note 27, at 460-74; J. WRIGHT,
supra note 27; Arnull, Making the European Convention Work, 1985 PUBL. L. 378;
Donnelly, supra note 2; Ermacora, The System of the Protection of Human Rights
within the Framework of the Council of Europe, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CAPETOWN
CONFERENCE 236 (C. Forsyth & J. Schiller eds. 1979); Jensen, The Impact of the European Conventionfor the Protection of Human Rights on National Law, 52 U. CIN. L.
REV. 760 (1983); Russell, The European Convention on Human Rights: An Assessment, 1979 CONTEMP. REV. 169. See also Second Seminar on International Law and
European Law at the University of Neuchtel, Merger of the European Commission and
European Court of Human Rights, 8 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1 (1985).
Regarding the Inter-American human rights regime, see, e.g., ORGANIZATION OF

supra note 10; P.

AMERICAN STATES, THE INTER-AMERICAN

COMMISSION ON HUMAN

RIGHTS: TEN

supra note 81; Carreno, Some Problems Presented by Application of the Interpretationof the American Convention on Human Rights, 30 AM. U.L.
YEARS OF ACTIVITIES,

REV. 127 (1981); Donnelly, supra note 2; Norris, IndividualPetition Procedure,supra
note 126; Peddicord, supra note 81; Pena, Human Rights: The Statute of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 735 (1980).
Regarding the African human rights regime, see, e.g., Aluko, supra note 128; Gittleman, Legal Analysis, supra note 128; Lihau, supra note 128; Umozurike, supra note
128.
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mendations without delay especially those that seek to enhance accessibility and reduce the problems of admissibility. Though "[diecent, pluralistic societies cannot be built in a day,"2 ' the regional promotion and
protection of human rights is perhaps the most effective vehicle for advancing the cause of human dignity worldwide. They deserve, therefore,
maximum responsible attention and encouragement.

281.

T.

FARER, GRAND STRATEGY,

supra note 104, at 174.

